The Hubble Space Telescope optical systems failure report by unknown
The Hubble Telescope 
- 
ODtid Failure Rewrt 
November 1930 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19910003124 2020-03-19T20:52:54+00:00Z
Tne Hubble Space Telescope 
Optical Systems Failure Report 
November 1W 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Dr. Lew Allen, Chairman 
Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Dr. ~ o ~ e r  hinge1 L 
Professor of Astronomy, Steward Observatory 
University of Arizona 
~ e a d ,  Optics ~ r a a ,  ~ ~ a c 2 ~ e c h n o l o ~ ~  Division 
NASMGoddard Space Flight Center 
~ r x e o r g e  A. ~ o d n e ~ A  
Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Quality 
NASA Headquarters 
Professor Robert R. Shannon 
Director, Optical Sciences Center 
University of Arizona 
Mr. Charles P. spoelh& 
Vice President (Retired), Eastman Kodak Company 
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) was launched aboard the Space Shuttle 
Discovery on April 24, 1990. During checkout on orbit, it was discovered that the 
telescope could not be properly focused because of a flaw in the optics. The HST 
Project Manager announced this failure on June 21, 1990. Both of the high- 
resolution imaging cameras (the Wide Fieldplanetary Camera and the Faint Object 
Camera) showed the same characteristic distortion, called spherical aberration, that 
must have originated in the primary mirror, the secondary mirror, or both. 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Associate 
Administrator for the Office of Space Science and Applications then formed the 
Hubble Space Telescope Optical Systems Board of Investigation on July 2, 1990, to 
determine the cause of the flaw in the telescope, how it occurred, and why it was 
not detected before launch. The Board conducted its investigation to include 
interviews with personnel involved in the fabrication and test of the telescope, 
review of documentation, and analysis and test of the equipment used in the 
. fabrication of the telescope's mirrors. The information in this report is based 
exclusively on the analyses and tests requested by the Board, the testimony given 
to the Board, and the documentation found during this investigation. 
Continued analysis of images transmitted from the telescope indicated that 
most, if not all, of the problem lies in the primary mirror. The Board's 
investigation of the manufacture of the mirror proved that the mirror was made in 
the wrong shape, being too much flattened away from the mirror's center (a. 
0.4-wave rms wavefront error at 632.8 nm). The error is ten times larger than the 
specified tolerance. 
The primary mirror is a disc of glass 2.4 m in diameter, whose polished front 
surface is coated with a very thin layer of aluminum. When glass is polished, 
small amounts of material are worn away, so by selectively polishing different 
parts of a mirror, the shape is altered. During the manufacture of all telescope 
mirrors there are many repetitive cycles in which the surface is tested by reflecting 
light from it; the surface is then selectively polished to correct any errors in its 
shape. The error in the HST's mirror occurred because the optical test used in this 
process was not set up correctly; thus the surface was polished into the wrong 
shape. 
The primary mirror was manufactured by the Perkin-Elmer Corporation, now 
Hughes Danbury Optical Systems, Inc., which was the contractor for the Optical 
Telescope Assembly. The critical optics used as a template in shaping the mirror, 
the reflective null corrector (RNC), consisted of two small mirrors and a lens. The 
RNC was designed and built by the Perkin-Elmer Corporation for the HST Project. 
This unit had been preserved by the manufacturer exactly as it was during the 
manufacture of the mirror. When the Board measured the RNC, the lens was 
incorrectly spaced from the mirrors. Calculations of the effect of such 
displacement on the primary mirror show that the measured amount, 1.3 mm, 
accounts in detail for the amount and character of the observed image blurring. 
No verification of the reflective null corrector's dimensions was carried out by 
Perkin-Elmer after the original assembly. There were, however, clear indications 
of the problem from auxiliary optical tests made at the time, the results of which 
have been studied by the Board. A special optical unit called an inverse null 
corrector, designed to mimic the reflection from a perfect primary mirror, was built 
and used tpalign the apparatus; when so used, it clearly showed the error in the 
reflective null corrector. A second null corrector, made only with lenses, was used 
to measure the vertex radius of the f i shed  primary mirror. It, too, clearly showed 
the error in the primary mirror. Both indicators of error were discounted at the 
time as being themselves flawed. 
The Perkin-Elmer plan for fabricating the primary mirror placed complete 
reliance on the reflective null corrector as the only test to be used in both 
manufacturing and verifying the mirror's surface with the required precision. 
NASA understood and accepted this plan. This methodology should have alerted 
NASA management to the fragility of the process and the possibility of gross error, 
that is, a mistake in the process, and the need for continued care and 
consideration of independent measurements. 
\ 
-, The design of the telescope and the measuring instruments was performed well 
by skilled optical scientists. However, the fabrication was the responsibility of the 
Optical Operations Division at the Perkin-Elmer Corporation (P-E), which was 
', insulated from review or technical supervision. The P-E design scientists, 
\\&nagement, and Technical Advisory Group, as well as NASA management and 1 NASA review activities, all failed to follow the fabrication process with reasonable 
diligence and, according to testimony, were unaware that discrepant data existed, 
although the data were of concern to some members of P-E's Optical Operations 
Division. Reliance on a single test method was a process which was clearly 
vulnerable to simple error. Such errors had been seen in other telescope 
programs, yet no independent tests were planned, although some simple tests to 
protect against major error were considered and rejected. During the critical time 
period, there was great concern about cost and schedule, which hrther inhibited 
consideration of independent tests. 
The most unfortunate aspect of this HST optical system failure, however, is that 
the data revealing these errors were available from time to time in the fabrication 
process, but were not recognized and fully investigated at the time. Reviews were 
inadequate, both internally and externally, and the engineers and scientists who 
were qualified to analyze the test data did not do so in sufficient detail. 
Competitive, organizational, cost, and schedule pressures were all factors in 
limiting full exposure of all the test information to qualified reviewers. 
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The rough grinding operation for the Hubble Space Telescope began in 
December 1978, at the Perkin-Elmer Corporation, in Wilton, Connecticut. The 
mirror was then transferred to Perkin-Elmer in Danbury, Connecticut, now Hughes 
Danbury Optical Systems, Inc. (HDOS), where polishing was completed in April 
1981, and the mirror was accepted as ready for reflective coating. The final post- 
coating test was made in February 1982. 
Approximately two months after launch, on June 21, 1990, the Hubble Space 
Telescope Project Manager announced that there was a major flaw in one or both 
of the mirrors in the Optical Telescope Assembly. Dr. Lennard Fisk, Associate 
Administrator for the Office of Space Science and Applications, in accordance with 
the procedures of the HST Contingency Plan, established the Hubble Space 
Telescope Optical Systems Board of Investigation to determine the relevant facts. 
A copy of the Board's charter, incorporated in a letter of authorization to the 
Chairman, and a list of the members of the Board are presented in Appendix A of 
this report. 
The Board, in accordance with its charter, impounded all relevant 
documentation and equipment at the HDOS facility. With the assistance of HDOS 
personnel and NASA HST Project and Program management, the Board reviewed 
documents, interviewed personnel, and analyzed and tested the equipment used 
during the fabrication of the mirrors. 
The first meeting of the Board was held in Washington, DC on July 5 and 6, 
1990, and the subsequent meetings were held at HDOS. A summary of all the 
Board meetings and attendees can be found in Appendix B. 
The investigation was quickly directed to the fabrication and testing of the 
primary mirror. The test equipment used during the final shaping and polishing of 
the primary mirror was found in 1990 in essentially the same configuration as it 
had been when used in 1980 through 1982. 
Another investigating body, the Independent Optical Review Panel, was formed 
by the HST Project to examine the on-orbit data and recommend actions to 
maximize the scientific utility of the HST. One of the principal concerns of the 
Independent Optical Review Panel is the impact of the spherical aberration 
discovered in the HST primary mirror. The results and findings of the HST Optical 
Systems Board of Investigation will undoubtedly assist the Independent Optical 
Review Panel in its work. (An early report of the Panel's findings is included in 
Appendix B.) 
This report of the Board's investigation describes the results of the analysis and 
test of the equipment used during fabrication and sets forth the conclusions which 
can be drawn. It is difficult to reconstruct the exact events of the time, particularly 
since the status of the documentation is poor. It is also difficult to consider fairly 
the pressures of the time in question when cost and schedule were issues of crisis 
proportions. Therefore, the Board's judgments clearly benefit from hindsight, with 
the clear knowledge that an error occurred and should not have occurred. 
l X E  B E  SPACE TELESCOPE MISSION 
The HST was designed to be the first of the great space observatories. It was 
launched aboard the Space Shuttle and placed in an Earth orbit approximately 607 
kilometers in altitude. The expected life of the telescope is about 15 years, with 
instrument changeouts every 3 to 5 years. 
The goal of the mission is to extend our knowledge of the universe. A space- 
based telescope has the advantage of being in an environment free of the 
turbulence and absorption of the Earth's atmosphere. Prior to this mission, 
astronomical telescopes in space, such as the Einstein Observatory (HEAO-2) and 
the Infrared Astronomical Satellite (IRAS), had been designed to explore new 
wavelength bands not transmitted through the atmosphere. The HST was the first 
space telescope designed to overcome the blurring of images caused by the 
atmosphere. The inherent resolution of a precisely made telescope is in 
proportion to its diameter, and the large 2.4m aperture of HST promised images 
ten times sharper than the best images from the ground. 
At the heart of the Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA) is a 2.4-m Ritchey- 
Chretien telescope with a focal ratio of f/24. The optical range of the HST extends 
from 1,100 to 11,000 angstroms, and the performance quality in the ultraviolet is 
unique. Figure 2-1 illustrates the OTA. 
Eight instrument packages are attached to the HST: two cameras (Wide 
Field/Planetary Camera and Faint Object Camera), two spectrographs (Faint Object 
Spectrograph and High-Resolution Spectrograph), one photometer (High-Speed 
Photometer), and three fine guidance sensors. Each fine guidance sensor package 
also contains a wavefront sensor. Table 2-1 lists the HST and scientific instrument 
specifications. 
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Figure 2-1. Optical Telescope Assembly. 
Table 2-1. HST scientific instrument specifications. 
11,500 kg 
Ritchey-Chretien design Cassegrain telescope 
57.6 m folded to 6.4 m 
2.4 m in diameter 
0.3 m in diameter 
Field of View See instruments and sensors below 
Pointing Accuracy 0.007 arcsec for 24 hr 
Magnitude Range 5-29 mv 
Wavelength Range 1,10&11,000 angstroms 
Angular Resolution 0.1 arcsec at 6,328 angstroms 
611 km (330 nrni) inclined 28.5' from equator 
Principal Investigator F. D. Macchetto, European Space Agency (ESA) 
ESA Dornier, Matra Corp.) 
Field of View 
Radiator: 0.8 x 2.2 m 
J. A. Westphal, California Institute of Technology 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
fA2.9 0; f/30 @) 
160, 66 arcsec2 
Magnitude Range 9-28 mv 
Wavelength Range 1,150-1 1,000 angstroms 
0.9 x 0.9 x 2.2 m 
J. C. Brandt, NASAIGoddard Space Flight Center 
Ball Aerospace 
2 arcsec2 target, 0.25 arcsec2 science 
2,00&100,000 
17-11 mv 
Table 2-1. EST scientific instrument specifications (continued). 
Weight 
Dimensions 
Principal Investigator 
Contractor 
Apertures 
Resolution 
Magnitude Range 
Wavelength Range 
306 kg 
0.9 x 0.9 x 2.2 m 
R. J. Harms, NASMArnes Research Center 
Martin Marietta Corporation 
0.1-4.3 arcsec2 
250, 1,300 
19-26 m, 
1,100-8,000 angstroms 
Weight 
Dimensions 
Principal Investigator 
Contractor 
Apertures 
Resolution 
Magnitude Range 
Wavelength Range 
270 kg 
0.9 x 0.9 x 2.2 m 
R. Bless, University of Wisconsin 
University of Wisconsin 
0.4, 1.0, 10.0 arcsec2 
Filter-defined 
<24 m, 
1,2067,500 angstroms 
Weight 
Dimensions 
Contractor 
Astrometric Modes 
Precision 
Measurement Speed 
Field of View 
Magnitude Range 
Wavelength Range 
218 kg 
0.5 x 1 x 1.6 m 
Perkin-Elmer Corporation 
Stationary and moving target, scan 
0.002 arcsec2 
10 stars in 10 minutes 
Access: 60 arcmin2 
Detect: 5 arcsec2 
4-18.5 m, 
4,6767,000 angstroms 
Information provided by Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Inc. 
PROGRAM HISTORY AJTD MANAGErdENT 
A. RESPONSIBILITIES 
The HST program is the result of a cooperative effort between NASA and the 
European Space Agency, private contractors, and astronomers worldwide. The 
management responsibilities included design, development, launch, and daily 
operations of the telescope. The NASA Centers and prime contractors involved in 
the development of the HST, and their interrelationships, are listed in Figure 3-1. 
At NASA Headquarters, the director of the Astrophysics Division, who reports 
to the NASA Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Science and 
Applications, has overall authority for the HST Project. He assigned the NASA HST 
Program Manager to ensure that NASA policies and Project goals are maintained 
and to administer the schedule and budget. Overall science policy is the 
responsibility of the HST Program Scientist. 
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) was assigned as lead center for the HST 
Project management and tasked with the development of the telescope flight 
hardware and the general checkout phase after deployment. Responsibility for 
meeting the technical performance goals and for managing the program within 
budget and schedule was also with MSFC. Figure 3-2 is the MSFC organization 
chart for the HST. 
The other NASA Center with a major involvement in the Project is the Goddard 
Space Flight Center (GSFC), which was responsible for verifying the performance 
of the science instruments. GSFC also controls the daily operations of the HST. 
On October 16, 1990, the responsibility for the HST Project (except for the optical 
system failure questions) was transferred from MSFC to GSFC. 
The two prime contractors for the Project were Lockheed Missiles and Space 
Company, Inc. (LMSC) and the Perkin-Elmer Corporation (P-E). LMSC developed 
the Support Systems Module (SSM) and supervised many subcontracts; P-E 
designed and developed the OTA, including the fabrication of the primary and 
secondary mirrors. P-E was also responsible for verification testing and delivery of 
the OTA to LMSC, where the OTA was integrated with the other subsystems. In 
addition to the OTA, P-E developed the fine guidance sensors and wavefront 
sensors used in the HST. 
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HEADQUARTERS 
SPACE FLIGHT 
MISSILES & 
SPACE CO. 
HST SYSTEMS 
ENGINEERING & 
INTEGRATION 
SOLAR ARRAY 
FAINT OBJECT 
JOHNSON 
SPACE 
CENTER 
t HST/ORBITER/ CREW INTERFACE & OPERATIONS 
ACE TELESCOPE 
SCIENCE OPERATIONS 
. 1 I ' , 1 , 1 SUPERVISION OF 
SSM DESIGN, HST IN-FLIGHT SCIENCE OPERATIONS 
FABRICATION, MAINTENANCE 
ASSEMBLY PLANNING SCIENCE & 
& VERIFICATION ENGINEERING 
t L DATA ANALYSIS HST ASSEMBLY & VERIFICATION SPACE FLIGHT ASTRONOMICAL FINDINGS HST LAUNCH 
& ORBIT C OTA DESIGN. VERIFICATION FABRICATION, ASSEMBLY & - HST MISSION VERIFICATION OPERATIONS PLANNING FGS SYSTEM 
ENGINEERING 
-SUBCONTRACTOR 
MANAGEMENT 
SCIENTIFIC HSTJORBITER 
INSTRUMENTS (Sl) LAUNCH 
VERIFICATION 
SI C&DH 
SUBSYSTEM LAUNCH 
HST OPERATIONS 
CONTROL CENTER 
& SCIENCE 
OPERATIONS 
FACILITY 
t HST MISSION OPERATIONS 
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY LOCKHEED MISSILES AND SPACE COMPANY, INC. 
Figure 3-1. Hubble Space Telescope responsibilities. 
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Figure 3-2. MSFCts Hubble Space Telescope responsibilities. 
Before P-E was selected as the OTA prime contractor, the company was asked 
to design and build a smaller hyperbolic mirror in order to demonstrate their 
technical capability. A 1.5-rn mirror was successfully designed, fabricated, and 
tested using the new technologies that would be used for the larger 2.4-m HST 
primary mirror. After a competitive bid process, P-E was awarded the HST 
contract, based in part on their successful demonstration of the 1.5-m mirror and 
on other factors, including their proposed fine guidance sensors. 
Because NASA considered the quality of the primary mirror to be a major 
challenge, it directed P-E to subcontract with the Eastman Kodak Company to 
fabricate a second primary mirror. The fabrication and test methods used at 
Eastrnan Kodak and P-E were entirely different. It was the responsibility of NASA 
to review the final specifications of the mirrors and to choose the best .one for 
flight. The P-E primary and secondary mirrors were selected. 
B. ENVIRONMENT 
During 1981 and continuing through early 1982, the HST program was beset by 
many difficulties. The estimated cost of the P-E contract had increased several-fold 
and the schedule had slipped substantially. The fine guidance sensors were 
having serious technical problems, and the severity of the challenge to keep the 
mirrors sufficiently free from contamination to meet the specifications in ultraviolet 
light was just being recognized. The program was threatened with cancellation, 
and management ability was questioned. All these factors appear to have 
contributed to a situation where NASA and P-E management were likely to be 
distracted from supervision of mirror fabrication. 
A. HST OPTICAL DESIGN 
The Optical Telescope Assembly in the Hubble Space Telescope is a two- 
mirror reflecting telescope very similar to most Earth-based telescopes built in the 
last 75 years. These two-mirror telescopes are generally referred to as Cassegrain 
telescopes, after the French cleric who first published the design. The OTA is a 
special type of Cassegrain telescope called a Ritchey-Chretien (R-C) that has better 
optical performance over a larger format in the image plane. The mirrors in the 
R-C are slightly more aspheric (have a greater departure from a pure spherical 
shape) than in the Cassegrain type, but both types of telescopes are quite 
common. The primary mirror in the OTA, the one in which the error exists, is a 
2.4-m diameter concave hyperboloid. The 0.3-m diameter secondary mirror is a 
convex hyperboloid. This makes the OTA a little less than half the size of the 
Hale telescope on Mt. Palomar. 
B. OPTICAL TESTING 
Spherical mirrors are easy to make and to test, but such mirrors do not produce 
good-quality images. The aspheric mirrors used in Cassegrain or R-C telescopes 
can produce theoretically perfect images, but their aspheric shape makes them 
difficult to test. Because the two mirrors in the OTA are hyperboloids or aspheric 
mirrors, special test optics are needed to guarantee that the mirrors are the correct 
shape. These special test optics, called null correctors, generate test reference 
wavefronts that make the aspheric mirror look spherical to the optician. The null 
correctors achieve this effect by projecting an optical template of the desired 
aspheric shape that can be designed to be accurate to better than 25 nanometers. 
C. NULL CORRECTORS AND OPTICS 
The convex secondary mirror of the OTA was tested in a geometrically perfect 
null test with what is called a Hindle Shell test, a modification of the classic Hindle 
Sphere test. Because hyperboloids have the property of perfectly imaging rays 
from one focus into the other focus, the Hindle Shell null corrector is used to 
physically implement this test. The Hindle test of the OTA secondary was carried 
out precisely as planned, 2nd the shape of this mirror met specification. The 
aspheric shape of the secondary mirror was verdied through the use of two 
independent tests during fabrication of the component. 
In the manufacture of prior telescopes, refractive null correctors (RvNCs), such 
as the one shown in Figure 4-1, were used. The combination of the two precisely 
made and spaced lenses produces the desired optical template of the concave 
aspheric mirror. 
Carrying out an unambiguous and accurate test to determine whether a null 
corrector is producing the correct optical template is a known difficulty. For the 
HST program, Perkin-Elmer concluded that an RvNC would not yield sufficient 
precision for testing the figure of the primary mirror, and as a result, a new and 
novel reflective null corrector (RNC) was designed. As shown in Figure 4-2, the 
Perkin-Elmer RNC consists of two spherical mirrors and one small field lens. (The 
more common RNC design contains only a single mirror and a field lens.) In the 
P-E design, the shape of the optical template could be precisely predicted simply 
by knowing the manufactured dimensions of the two mirrors and the lens, 
including the lens material, and the spacings of the three optical elements. Perkin- 
Elmer planned to certify the RNC with great care, and they did not plan to do any 
independent testing of the mirror. 
The RNC was designed to provide easy access to all the optical surfaces in the 
null corrector in order to measure these spacings at any time. The spacing 
between the two spherical mirrors can be measured by determining the distance 
between the centers of curvature of the two mirrors. This measurement is done 
interferometrically, using a known metering rod of the desired length. In a similar 
manner, the field lens spacing can be measured relative to the center of curvature 
of the lower mirror. The spacings need to be correct to 10 pm to meet 
specifications. 
This ability to measure the optical element spacings at any time is something 
that is not possible with a traditional RvNC, made up of all lenses and no mirrors. 
The novel RNC that answered some of the misgivings about the RvNC approach 
was one of the factors leading to the award of the HST contract to Perkin-Elmer. 
As a check on the position of the Coaxial Reference Interferometer (CORI) 
used with the RNC, an inverse null corrector (INC) was designed. When swung 
under the RNC, the INC would simulate a perfect mirror, just as a perfect primary 
mirror would appear with straight fringes when viewed through the RNC 
(Figure 4-3). 
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Figure 4-1. Two-element refractive null corrector. 
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Figure 4-2. Reflective null corrector. 
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Figure 4-3. Inverse null corrector inserted below the reflective null corrector. 
Although not considered as a backup or additional check of the optical 
template produced by the RNC, an RvNC was built to test the OTA primary during 
early stages of polishing and was again used to test the primary mirror during a 
measurement of the vertex radius of curvature or "power" of the primary mirror. 
The RvNC had to be used for this radius measurement because the RNC had to 
have central holes in the two mirrors (just as the primary had a hole) to let the 
light through. Because of the holes in the RNC mirrors, it was not possible to see 
the location of the vertex of the primary mirror. 
"White-light" fringes were used as an initial setup procedure to align the 
reference test plate (i.e., the calibrated mirror inserted into the hole of the primary 
mirror) for the vertex radius measurement. This measurement was extremely 
sensitive to vibration, and the fringes could not be captured on film because of the 
short duration and faintness of the images. Several observers were required to 
witness that the fringes were seen. When this test was accomplished, a helium- 
neon (He-Ne) laser replaced the white-light source in order to take photographs 
(interferograms) by which to make the vertex radius measurement. 
D. POLISHING 
During the polishing of the OTA mirrors, the Hindle test was performed on the 
secondary mirror, and its surface was polished until it looked like a pure sphere to 
about 0.012-wave rms wavefront error at 632.8 nrn. This meant that the surface 
was the correct hyperboloid to this same quality, a quality better than that 
specified in the contract. 
The backup OTA primary mirror was polished at Eastrnan Kodak Company 
using both a refractive and a reflective null corrector of a completely different 
design from the Perkin-Elmer version. This mirror matched the templates of the 
two null correctors to better than 0.014-wave rrns wavefront error at 632.8 nm, and 
the Board has every reason to believe it is the correct hyperboloidal shape. 
The primary mirror now flying in the HST was polished using the Perkin-Elmer 
RNC as a guide or template. Again, the fit to the template was better than 
0.014-wave rms wavefront error at 632.8 nrn, better than the contract specification 
for the accuracy of the mirror. Unfortunately, as has been subsequently learned, 
there was an error in the template produced by the RNC, thus making the primary 
mirror the wrong shape. 
E. FINAL TESTS 
An end-to-end test of the OTA would have been very expensive to perform at 
the level of accuracy specified for the telescope. The test would have cost on the 
order of what the OTA itself cost, because a flat or plano mirror would have been 
needed. To test the flat mirror by a single interferogram would have required a 
spherical mirror about 15 percent larger than the flat mirror. Thus the test could 
have required two additional mirrors as large as or larger than the OTA primary. 
In hindsight, a much less severe test could have been done to check for a gross 
error such as did occur. The belief at the time was that if the two mirrors had 
each exceeded their individual specifications, only a test at the level of accuracy of 
the individual mirrors would have been meaningful. Such a test would have been 
very hard to justify because of cost. 
Actually, an end-to-end test was done over a 0.3-m diameter aperture to ensure 
that the assembled-telescope focused where it should. There was no attempt to 
use this test as a check on the figure of the primary mirror, apparently because it 
was believed that the fraction of the mirror tested was too small to give reliable 
results and also because the OTA was mounted horizontally and the distortion due 
to gravity was significant. 
The Level I specification for the HST is to achieve 70 percent encircled energy 
in a circle of 0.1-arcsecond radius and to meet a Rayleigh criterion (i.e., image 
resolution of two objects) of at least 0.1 arcsecond. Early in the checkout phase of 
the mission, it was discovered that the telescope did not meet the above 
requirement. Instead, the telescope focused 70 percent encircled energy into a 
0.7-arcsecond radius. Figure 5-1 is a plot of the encircled energy percentage 
versus radius in arcseconds for both the specified HST performance and the actual 
performance. 
The problem was initially detected when the "first light" images from both the 
Wide FieldIPlanetary Camera and the Faint Object Camera were analyzed and 
major defects were detected. Computer simulation of these images indicated that 
0.5-wave rrns wavefront spherical aberration at 547 nm existed in the telescope 
and not in the instruments. Further verification of the spherical aberration 
problem came from the wavefront sensors. 
Both on-axis and off-axis data were analyzed in order to determine whether 
the primary mirror or the secondary mirror, or perhaps both mirrors, were flawed. 
Data taken by the wavefront sensors, the Wide Field/Planetary Camera, and the 
Faint Object Camera indicated a significant spherical aberration wavefront error. 
Although some coma appeared in the off-axis results taken by the fine guidance 
sensors, the amount of coma was small and the conclusion was reached that the 
primary source of image spreading is spherical aberration of the primary mirror. 
Spherical aberration distorts a point source image (e.g., a distant star) by 
broadening the image and surrounding it with concentric diffraction rings. This 
broadening effect prevents distant, closely spaced objects from being separated in 
the image. A tutorial on spherical and coma aberration is given in Appendix C. 
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Figure 5-1. Encircled energy versus arcsecond radius of image produced by 
the HST. 
A. ONBOARD DATA 
The first step in focusing the HST requires the onboard pointing control system 
(PCS) to position the telescope at a known pattern of stars that are imaged into the 
three fine guidance sensors (FGS). Once this pattern of stars is locked onto by the 
FGS, the secondary mirror is moved along the axis of symmetry in order both to 
ensure that the mirror is moving in the correct direction and to obtain an accurate 
estimate of where the best focus is located. It was a NASA policy that first light 
images would not be recorded until after the best focus had been obtained using 
the FGS. 
Several problems occurred early in the checkout phase. The PCS was hindered 
by the thermal environment at the terminator (where the HST passes from Earth 
shadow to sunlight and vice versa), which induced a mechanical distortion in the 
solar array structure, in turn causing pointing difficulties. In addition, the HST's 
star trackers executed several improper star acquisitions, causing the telescope to 
be pointed in the wrong direction; only three of the first 16 star acquisitions were 
successful. Both these effects severely complicated the focusing activity. 
After a position for the secondary mirror was selected for first light, the Wide 
Fieldfilanetary Camera (WF/PC) recorded its first image. The initial image 
analysis indicated significant defects. Since the secondary mirror had only been 
moved along the axis of symmetry, it was still believed at the time that corrections 
could be made by tilting or decentering the mirror to improve the focus. 
The next portion of the checkout involved using the wavefront sensors (WFS), 
which are more sensitive than the FGS, to precisely analyze the errors in the 
optical wavefront. Deviations from a perfect incoming shape could then be 
precisely determined and quantified. Such deviations can take on any geometrical 
shape and are classified as alignment errors or optical aberrations such as 
astigmatism, spherical aberration, and coma. 
The secondary mirror was again moved along the axis of symmetry, and the 
wavefront was analyzed by the WFS. At the same time, star images were made 
with the WF/PC. Both the WFS and the W/PC indicated that a large amount of 
spherical aberration was present. Subsequent calibration tests indicated that the 
spherical aberration was not internal to the WF/PC. 
Corrections to the imaging defects due to misalignment were attempted by 
tilting and decentering the secondary mirror, but these adjustments did not 
improve the wavefront or the image quality. Further analysis and computer 
simulation of the W / P C  images indicated that 0.5-wave rms wavefront spherical 
aberration at 547 nm (equivalent to 0.43-wave rms wavefront error at 632.8 nm) 
existed in the telescope (Figure 6-1). When interferograms taken by the WFS also 
indicated severe spherical aberration, the HST Project Manager was notified, and 
the Contingency Plan was put into effect. 
At this point, the activity began centering on determining which mirror, or 
perhaps both mirrors, had the incorrect shape. Error in the primary mirror would 
exhibit spherical aberration both along the axis of symmetry, where the W/PC is 
located, and off-axis, where the FGS, WFS, and Faint Object Camera are located. 
If the secondary mirror were flawed, there should have been a large amount of 
coma in addition to the spherical aberration. No significant amount of coma was 
detected and, consequently, it was decided that most of the error resided in the 
primary mirror. 
The NASA Administrator directed the MSFC Project Office to establish an 
Independent Optical Review Panel to further investigate the problem and 
recommend follow-on actions. Shortly thereafter, the Hubble Space Telescope 
Optical Systems Board of Investigation was formed to determine the technical facts 
behind the failure. 
B. SOURCES OF ERROR 
The HST investigation indicated some inconsistencies in the primary mirror's 
test data. The historical test data showed that the primary mirror appeared to have 
spherical aberration when tested against the refractive null corrector, which was 
used to test the vertex radius of the primary mirror. At the time of the fabrication, 
P-E believed (without independent verification) that some level of error may have 
existed in the RvNC. An analysis conducted by the Board verified that the RvNC 
was accurate to better than 0.02 wave rms. 
The final test data for the primary mirror, obtained using the reflective null 
corrector, indicated that the mirror exceeded the specifications. The Board found 
interferograms relating to the RvNC test (found in Appendix D), which indicated a 
surface-figure error of about the right magnitude and sign to explain the errors 
existing in the operational telescope. Since a perfectly polished mirror would have 
shown no error on either null corrector, it was evident to the Board that an error 
actually existed in the mC. 
(a) Recorded image of the PC5 star taken on June 14,1990, with a 0-pm 
inside focus. 
Figure 6-1. Planetary Camera images versus computer simulations. The 
images in the top frames were taken with the Planetary Camera; those in 
the bottom frames are computer simulations created using an optical 
model with 0.5-wave rrns wavefront error at 547 nm. 

(b) Recorded image of the PC5 star taken on June 21,1990, with a -300-pm 
inside focus. 
Figure 6-1 (continued). The images in both (a) and (b) show a linear- 
intensity display on the left, and a logarithmic ("stretched") image display 
on the right. The focal position denotes the position of the secondary 
mirror. (Data were supplied by Dr. Jon Holtzman.) 

A fault-tree analysis of the RNC and the manufacturing data indicated three 
reasonable possibilities for the error: 
(1) The field lens was inserted backward. 
(2) The index of refraction of the field lens was incorrect (i.e., the 
wrong glass was used). 
(3) The optical elements were incorrectly spaced (a circumstance that 
seemed highly unlikely because of the method used to set the lens 
spacings). 
It was possible to be so specific because spherical aberration is a symmetric 
error and can only be produced by a longitudinal spacing error. A more extensive 
analysis to cover other, less viable causes of spherical aberration was halted once 
the Board agreed on the cause of the on-orbit spherical aberration. 
The Board decided that no tests were to be performed on the null correctors 
that might in any way disturb their present condition, because the null correctors 
were the only direct links by which to determine the actual shape of the primary 
mirror in orbit. This precise shape data would be needed if the telescope were to 
be fixed or brought back to the originally specified image quality. 
Under this restriction, the RNC could not be moved from its place at the top of 
the test tower, nor could it be adjusted or disassembled. By design, the RNC had 
access ports in its sides so that it was possible to get at the various optical 
elements in order to make the necessary measurements. 
The first test performed on the RNC was to insert the INC and take an 
interferogram on July 22, 1990. This interferogram was analyzed and compared 
with a previous interferogram taken with the INC in place. (This latter 
interferogram was found in a notebook of a P-E employee and was dated June 22, 
1982.) Comparison of these two interferograms (Figure 6-2) shows virtually 
identical' results, clearly indicating the existence of spherical aberration. These INC 
interferograms are corroborated by the RvNC interferograrns, which also show 
spherical aberration (as discussed in Appendix D, Figure D-2). The combination 
of these interferograrns led the Board to conclude that the CORI/RNC assembly is 
now essentially in the same state of operation as it was at the time the final 
measurements were made on the primary mirror. 
Unverifiable testimony raised the possibility of a waiver having been granted for 
an optical spacing error in the INC. During the current investigation, an error in 
the design calculations was discovered that produced a small amount of spherical 
aberration in the INC. An analysis of the "as-built" INC conducted for the investi- 
gation showed that the instrument had an accuracy to better than 0.14 wave. 
SCHMIDT COEFFICIENTS 
Figure 6-2. Comparison of 1982 and 1990 inverse null corrector data. 
(a) The coefficients which define the magnitude of various distortions to 
the wavefront were measured by the INC when it was inserted in front of 
the RNC in 1982 and in 1990. (b) The coefficient data were extracted from 
these plots of the interferograms. 
The amount of spherical aberration introduced by the INC error is only a small 
amount compared to the amount of spherical aberration actually measured. 
The first possibility of error in the RNC involved the field lens. Measurements 
were made and it was determined that the field lens was not put into the RNC 
assembly backwards. 
The next test was to measure the effective focal length of the field lens to 
verify that the correct material had been used. The actual measurement 
determined the magnification of the field lens and verified that the correct glass 
had been used. Two spare lenses from the same lot were also measured for figure 
and focal length, and the measurements confirmed the results on the installed field 
lens. 
Since the index was not in error, plans were made to measure the spacing of 
the field lens to the lower mirror in the RNC. This measurement could not be 
made as it was originally, because the metering rod used at the time of initial 
assembly was too long to fit in the assembled RNC and interferometer unit. 
The RNC was designed such that high-precision (1-pm) measurements of the 
optical elements could be taken at any time. In the case of the 1.5-m prototype 
mirror, the metering rods could be positioned within the RNC to perform the 
spacing measurements. For the 2.4m design, the spacing between the optics was 
greater and therefore the metering rods needed to be lengthened. The longest rod 
was lengthened in such a way that it could only be inserted in one piece and, 
consequently, a reverification of this spacing could not be made with this rod 
since disassembly of the RNC would be required. In principle, a new rod could 
have been designed in two pieces that would have allowed a remeasurement of 
the distance from the field lens to the center of curvature of the lower mirror. 
The optical element spacing was measured in 1330 by shining collimated light 
up through the field lens using a Zygo interferometer as the source, and by 
placing a flat mirror at the focus of the field lens (a distance of about 0.55 m above 
the lens). The correct position of the mirror was determined by using the 
interferometer to find the best focus (Figure 6-3). The distance from the flat mirror 
was then measured down to the vertex of the lower mirror using a furture in the 
mirror hole for a reference. This measurement showed that the field lens was 
about 1.3 rnrn too far from the lower mirror. Both the direction and the magnitude 
of the spacing error correctly explained the spherical aberration observed in the 
HST image data. The spacings of the other optical elements in the RNC were 
measured and were found to be correct. 
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Figure 6-3. The 1990 spacing measurement between the field lens and the 
lower mirror of the reflective null corrector, using an optical test, 
In addition to the optical test used to detect the field-lens spacing error, a 
direct physical measurement was made from the field lens to the vertex of the 
lower mirror (Figure 6-4). A lightweight spacing rod and a new vertex plug were 
made. The results verified the previously measured spacing error to &0.1 mrn. 
More accurate measurements of the displacement error will be done at a later time, 
as this information is necessary for an accurate determination of a prescription for 
the recovery optics. 
When the field lens position error (FLPE) is taken into account and applied in 
correcting the data taken with the RNC, it results in a mirror shape that would 
account for most of the error observed in the HST images. Also, the 
interferograrns taken with the RvNC were reprocessed and corrected for the as- 
built data available for the RvNC. This independent set of data yields a mirror 
shape very close in value to the RNC/FLPE data. These data led the Board to 
conclude that the predominant source of error had been found and was caused by 
the field lens position error. (See Appendix E for the HST performance based on 
the as-built data.) 
Figure 6-4. The 1990 spacing measurement between the lower mirror 
vertex and the field lens of the reflective null corrector, 
using a mechanical technique. 
HOW OR O C C m D  
A. INTRODUCTION 
It has been established that the field lens was approximately 1.3 mm too far 
from the lower mirror of the RNC, which was used to figure the primary mirror. 
The RNC and its associated interferometer were found in the test chamber, unused 
and unchanged since the completion of the HST program. The RNC was 
measured in situ, and there is high confidence that the spacing error existed 
during the fabrication and test of the HST primary mirror. The cause of the 
spacing error, on the other hand, becomes a matter of conjecture, because the 
records necessary to reproduce what actually happened were not found. The 
scenario given below reproduces the events and provides a rationale of how the 
spacing error occurred. This scenario was simulated in the laboratory under the 
guidance of the Board and is the most likely cause of the error. 
B. METERING ROD MEASulUDElWS 
At the beginning of the program to build the 2.4-m Hubble primary mirror, P-E 
modified the RNC that had been used in building a 1.5-m mirror prototype. This 
modification required adding a new field lens and respacing the optical elements 
to create the correct shape for the larger mirror. Figure 7-1 is a schematic of this 
RNC, including the positions of the metering rods used to set the optics. 
There were three metering rods (labeled A, B, and C) made of Invar, a metal 
with a small temperature expansion coefficient. The ends of the metering rods 
were rounded and polished because the very precise positioning of the optics in 
the RNC used an interferometer, rather than a mechanical measurement. This 
procedure involved auto-reflecting a focused beam of light off the end of a rod 
and observing an interference pattern from the beam that came back on itself. 
Centering the light beam on the rod end was essential for the measurement. 
To prevent the metering rod from being misaligned laterally with respect to the 
interferometer axis, P-E decided to attach "field caps" to one end of the rod 
(Figures 7-2 and 7-3). The field caps were fitted over the rod ends and had a 
small aperture in the center to ensure centering of the rod on the beam. 
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Figure 7-1. Position of metering rods used to space optical elements in the 
reflective null corrector. 
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Figure 7-3. Metering rod in position between the field lens and the center 
of curvature of the lower mirror in the reflective null corrector. 

The top surface of the field cap was covered with nonreflecting material; however, 
some of this material had, apparently inadvertently, broken away from a small area 
around the field cap aperture. It appears that the operator obtained reflection 
from the field cap where the nonreflecting material was absent, rather than the rod 
end, causing the 1.3-mm misspacing. A test performed in 1990 with the 
equipment showed that it was quite easy, even probable, to make this error with 
the configuration used. Figure 7-4 indicates how the displacement error occurred 
by reflecting light off the field cap, rather than the rod end, as designed. Figure 
7-5 is a photograph of the field cap and shows the specular region around the 
aperture. (In this photograph, the broken-away coating appears darker than the 
surrounding region.) 
With one end of the metering rod presumably located at the center of 
curvature of the lower RNC mirror, the field lens was then brought up to the end 
of rod B, but there was no adjustment left in the screws used for this positioning. 
More adjustment room was made by inserting spacers between the field lens and 
the lower mirror mounting plate. The adjustment mechanism was found not to be 
staked. Staking, i.e., securing the mechanism to prevent inadvertent movement, 
was a specified procedure. The final location of the field lens was then set with 
the addition of the spacers. As a result, the field lens was about 1.3 rnm too far 
from its correct position relative to the lower mirror. 
INTERFEROMETER OBJECTIVE 
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Figure 7-4. Displacement due to the interferometer focusing on the field 
cap instead of the metering rod. 
Figure 7-5. Top view of the field cap, showing the aperture and the area 
where the antireflective coating had broken away. 
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The error in the HST has brought the role of quality assurance (QA) into 
question, since the problem remained undiscovered before launch. From an 
examination of the evidence, it is clear that there were specific QA requirements in 
the contract for the building of the OTA and that an "OTA Product Assurance Plan" 
was written and released in 1978 by Perkin-Elmer. Less clear are the contract's 
data retention requirements and to which aspects of the P-E hardware they 
applied. While the OTA Product Assurance Plan did not specifically refer to 
testing of the RNC, the plan did set forth detailed requirements in regard to 
validation and engineering sign-off that would have ensured that the RNC would 
be adequately designed and tested. If this QA plan had been rigorously applied, it 
is probable that the HST error would never have occurred. At the very least, it 
would have been much easier to reconstruct what had happened if a complete 
record of the fabrication of the test equipment and mirrors had been retained. 
Review of the existing documentation indicates that the QA function relating to 
the metrology of the primary mirror was inadequately staffed. Defense Contract 
Administration Services (DCAS), now Defense Contract Management Command 
(DCMC), personnel were not added to the Project's staff until after the primary 
mirror was completed. Both the MSFC and the P-E QA personnel were excluded 
from key areas and at critical times. This decision was made by P-E engineering 
management with the concurrence of the MSFC Project Office. The result of this 
decision was that an informed and independent evaluation of the assembly and 
manufacturing area was not done. 
In addition, the P-E QA personnel reported to the OTA Project Manager rather 
than to someone independent of immediate Project pressures. This may also 
explain why QA personnel were apparently denied access to metrology areas 
where they could have hindered the data-taking and analysis process. 
At the time of the primary mirror's polishing and testing, the quality reviews 
and audts conducted according to the QA Plan did not raise technical issues about 
the shortcomings of the test procedures prior to their implementation. The 
procedures did not provide criteria for the correct results of testing and thus did 
not provide guidance toward identifying unexpected out-of-limits behavior of the 
optical tests. In most cases, the expected results of the optical tests were not 
specified, and inexperienced personnel were not able to distinguish the presence 
of an unacceptable behavior of the tests. There was also no criterion given for the 
required experience of the observer approving passage of a milestone on the basis 
of test results. In hindsight, and with the knowledge there was a problem with the 
mirror, it is easy to see that various technical issues about the test procedures, such 
as the lack both of independent tests and of any correlation of the results of 
related tests, should have been questioned. 
When the primary mirror was transferred from P-E Wilton to P-E Danbury at 
the beginning of Phase I1 of the contract, a DoD-classified project was ongoing at 
the Danbury site. Initially, DoD imposed a restriction on the number of NASA 
personnel who had access to the Danbury facility. However, this restriction was 
seen by the MSFC Project Manager as being too constraining and then was 
subsequently renegotiated with DoD. Unlimited access by NASA personnel was 
allowed after that time. The DoD project did not prohibit NASA QA from 
adequately monitoring the P-E activity. 
The Optical Operations Division of P-E imposed its own access limitations to 
the Danbury metrology area where the RNC and INC were assembled. This area 
was secured by a cipher lock door, and only metrology engineers from the Wilton 
facility were allowed access. QA personnel from both NASA and P-E were not 
informed that this test equipment was being assembled and were aware of its 
existence only after the RNC assembly was moved to the OTA test chamber. No 
formal manufacturing-process paperwork on this activity was filed; consequently, 
the QA organization did not become involved. 
Other evidence that QA did not play as full a role as outlined in the QA Plan is 
shown by the lack of, or even callouts for, QA signatures on several procedures 
relating to the primary mirror metrology. Similarly, it is perhaps because the P-E 
QA personnel reported through the Project management that there is no written 
evidence that QA ever protested being denied access either to the primary mirror 
test area during the actual testing or to the area where the data were being 
analyzed. 
Finally, there is no evidence of QA records calling into question the 
discrepancies in the actual test data that seem so obvious in hindsight. No 
mention has been found in any records that the RNC could not be recalibrated in 
the same manner as when it was first assembled, or that the RNC/INC test showed 
spherical aberration when it should not have. Neither was any mention made that 
the vertex radius test with the RvNC showed spherical aberration in the finished 
primary mirror when it should have shown none. There was no formal and 
centralized information management system to retain and categorize the 
voluminous data that defined the HST. 
The documentation describing the addition of the spacers under the field lens 
to achieve the apparent proper spacing of this element was never filed or has 
been lost in the intervening 10 years. This can be understood in part since the QA 
organization was not involved in this activity. A reference was made during the 
testimony that a Material Review Board was held on the spacer issue, but no 
documentation was found. 
What is clear from the error that occurred, and the evidence found, is that QA 
has a significant role to play in the avoidance of similar problems on future 
programs. For this to happen, however, the role of QA must be understood and 
seen as a positive factor by top management. QA organizations must be 
adequately staffed by fully qualified individuals, and these people must be given 
free access to all aspects of the project, from conceptualization through final 
delivery. They should have clear authority to stop work on projects where there 
are unresolved quality issues. They should also have an independent reporting 
path to top management to avoid the undue influences and schedule pressures 
being imposed by the program or the engineering organizations. 
Further, thorough and well-cataloged documentation of all these aspects of the 
project must be maintained by the contractor and/or NASA for the duration of the 
mission. To do otherwise will make recovery of salvageable missions improbable 
or impossible. 
Additional quality assurance information on the HST can be found in an 
extensive report, SRM&QA Observations and Lessons Learned, by George A. 
Rodney, Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and Mission Quality, National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, dated October 1 9 0 .  
EIURBR WAS NOT DETECTED PRIOR TO FLIGHT 
The explanations for why the HST error was not detected before launch can be 
separated into two categories: factual and judgmental. Based on the test plan that 
was in place at the time of the fabrication of the HST mirrors, the factual issues 
presented in this Chapter were events that should have warned the Project 
personnel of the existence of a problem. The judgmental issues that follow are 
conclusions based on the Board's own expertise. 
A. FACTUAL STATEMENTS 
1. Complete reliance was placed on the reflective null corrector (RNC) to 
determine the shape of the primary mirror. It was determined that the RNC would 
be certified only by accurate measurement of the elements and the spacings. 
Although test philosophy placed great emphasis on "certification" of the RNC, the 
Board could not find documentation that the RNC was certified. In spite of the 
total reliance on the RNC, no independent measurements were made of the 
optical-element spacings of the RNC to verify the values. Although the RNC was 
designed so that spacings could be rechecked without disassembly, the actual 
implementation did not permit such measurements, and no remeasurement of 
spacings was made after'initial assembly. 
2. The erroneous measurement of the spacing of the field lens of the RNC 
led to the need to install spacers to increase the separation of the field lens from 
the lower mirror. The bolts securing the field-lens basket were not staked, 
suggesting a lack of quality surveillance, since securing bolts was a common and 
easily observable inspection to conduct. These anomalies should have led to a 
Material Review Board (MRB) approval document and a thorough consideration of 
the cause. Although the NASA representative recalls approving such an MRB, no 
documentation was found. 
3. After the RNC was assembled in the laboratory, an INC was set up below 
the RNC. The INC was intended to simulate a perfect mirror below the RNC so 
that any errors in the null corrector could be detected. The interferograrns taken 
when using the INC to align the RNC/CORI indicated a spherical aberration pattern 
(see Figure D-3). The full RNC/CORI assembly was then moved to the top of the 
optical telescope assembly test chamber, and each time the primary mirror was 
tested the INC was used to check the alignment of the setup. As before, the same 
spherical aberration distortion was evident in the fringes. These aberration fringes 
could not be aligned out and were incorrectly attributed to the spacing errors in 
the lens system of the INC. Perkin-Elmer's Optical Operation Division believed 
that the PNC was not reliable when, in fact, it was quite accurate enough to detect 
the gross error, and indeed did so. 
4. The vertex radius measurement taken by the refractive null corrector 
(RvNC) indicated the presence of spherical aberration (see Figure D-2). This 
information was dismissed, as it was in the case for the INC, because the RvNC 
was believed to be less precise than the RNC and therefore not reliable. It has 
been determined that the RvNC was easily accurate enough to detect the spherical 
aberration that existed, and its reliability should not have been discounted. 
5. There were two other occasions when a careful analysis of the data might 
have revealed the problem: 
a. The primary mirror was ground and polished to an approximate 
shape, about 1 wavelength rms, using the RvNC for the test. This 
took place at Perkin-Elmer's facility in Wilton, Connecticut. The 
mirror was then transferred to P-E's Danbury facility, where the RNC 
was the test instrument for final polishing. At the time of transfer, 
the interferograms obtained with the RvNC were compared with 
those obtained from the RNC, and the discrepancy could have been 
noted. However, the data and the circumstances of transfer are 
unclear, and the requirements for transfer appeared to be adequately 
met; therefore no concern was noted. 
b. After the assembly of the OTA, tests were performed to assure 
proper focus position. Those tests were made with a 0.36-m 
telescope (subaperture test), and careful analysis of the data might 
have revealed the problem. However, the data were complicated by 
gravity sag because the OTA was mounted horizontally, and only the 
focus position was verified. 
6. A range of feasible tests to verify the shape of the primary mirror were 
considered, but not carried out. Finally, no end-to-end tests were planned or 
implemented to verify the performance of the OTA. 
B. JUDGMENTAL STATEMENTS 
The following judgements are offered with the recognition that there were 
many distractions and crises during this period----cost, schedule, threat of 
cancellation, mirror contanination, possibility of mirror distortion caused by 
mount, etc. Nevertheless, the flaw occurred and, as can now be seen, these are 
factors that bear on that occurrence. 
1. The proposal of P-E, accepted by NASA, to rely entirely on the RNC 
should have alerted knowledgeable people in P-E and NASA that special attention 
was required to certify the RNC; to the need for independent validation of the RNC 
and/or the primary mirror; and to the need to examine and review the test data for 
any indications of inconsistency. A project test plan that considered the various 
measurements, the possibilities of error in each, and the feasibility of independent 
checks should have been prepared by the implementing organization and 
externally reviewed. 
2. The conclusion by P-E, accepted by NASA, that the RNC was the only 
device that would yield an accuracy of 0.01 wave rms at 632.8 nm led P-E to fail to 
consider any independent measurement which would yield less accuracy. In fact, 
such independent data were obtained incidental to other measurements and were 
rationalized away due to this mindset. 
3. The HST development program was complex and challenging and there 
were many issues demanding management attention; the primary mirror was only 
one of these. Although the telescope was recognized as a particular challenge, 
with a primary mirror requiring unprecedented performance, there was a 
surprising lack of participation by optical experts with experience in the 
manufacture of large telescopes during the fabrication phase. The NASA Project 
management did not have the necessary expertise to critically monitor the optical 
activities of the program and to probe deeply enough into the adequacy and 
competence of the review process that was established to guard against technical 
errors. The record of reviews reveals no sensitivity to in-process data and no 
questioning of the test method. 
4. The NASA Scientific Advisory Group did not have the depth of experience 
and skill to critically monitor the fabrication and test results of a large aspheric 
mirror. However, this Group should have recognized the criticality of the figure of 
the primary mirror and the fragility of the metrology approach, and these concerns 
should have impelled them to penetrate the process and ask for validation. 
5 .  A highly competitive environment existed between Perkin-Elmer and the 
Eastrnan Kodak subcontractor. Although the manufacturing process and the 
method of measurement for the backup primary mirror were reviewed and 
approved by P-E, there was limited additional technical exchange of experience. 
NASA did not utilize the opportunity offered by this directed subcontract to 
validate, and gain confidence in, the P-E approach to the primary mirror 
manufasmre. 
6. Perkin-Elmer line management did not review or supervise their Optical 
Operations Division adequately. In fact, the management structure provided a 
strong block against communication between the people actually doing the job 
and higher level experts both within and outside of P-E. 
7. The P-E Technical Advisory Group did not probe at all deeply into the 
optical manufacturing processes and, although they recognized the fragility of the 
measuring approach, they did not adequately assert their concerns or follow up 
with data reviews. This is particularly surprising since the members were aware of 
the history of manufacture of other Ritchey-Chretien telescopes, where spherical 
aberration was known to be a common problem. 
8. The most capable optical scientists at P-E were involved closely with the 
production of the 1.5-m demonstration mirror and the design of the HST mirror 
and the test apparatus. However, fabrication of the HST mirror was the 
responsibility of the Optical Operations Division of P-E, which did not include 
optical design scientists and which did not use the skills external to the Division 
which were available at Perkin-Elmer. 
9. The Optical Operations Division at P-E operated in a "closed-door" 
environment which permitted discrepant data to be discounted without review. 
During the testimony, it was indicated that some technical personnel in the Optical 
Operations Division were deeply concerned at the time that the discrepant optical 
data might indicate a flaw. There are no indications that these concerns were 
formally expressed outside this Division. 
10. The quality assurance people at P-E, NASA, and DCAS (Defense Contract 
Administration Services, now Defense Contract Management Command) were not 
optical experts and, therefore, were not able to distinguish the presence of 
inconsistent data results from the optical tests. The DCAS people concentrated 
mainly on safety issues. 
11. The basic product assurance requirements and formal review processes 
were procedurally adequate to raise critical issues in most safety, material, and 
handling matters, but not in optical matters. 
12. The inability of P-E to provide the Board with vital archival data on the 
design and manufacture of the primary mirror is an indication of inadequate 
documentation practices, which hampered the Board in determining the source of 
the primary mirror error. 
A. IDENTIFY AND MITIGATE RISK 
The Project Manager must make a deliberate effort to identify those aspects of 
the project where there is a risk of error with serious consequences for the 
mission. Upon recognizing the risks the manager must consider those actions 
which mitigate that risk. 
In this case, the primary mirror fabrication task was identified as particularly 
challenging due to the stringent performance requirements. The contractor clearly 
specified in the proposal that total reliance would be placed on a single test 
instrument and that no optical performance tests would be made at higher levels 
of assembly. Therefore, OTA performance would be determined by component 
tests and great care in precision assembly. Although NASA accepted this proposal, 
the methodology should have alerted NASA management to the fragility of the 
process, the possibility of gross error (that is, a mistake in the process), and the 
need for continued care and consideration of independent tests. 
The history of spherical aberration in the primary mirrors of Ritchey-Chretien 
telescopes was known to some of the optical scientists involved, but did not lead 
to specific recommendations early in the Project. Late in the Project an advisory 
group did call out the risk of gross error and suggested simple tests to check for 
such errors. This recommendation was not seriously considered, primarily due to 
total lack of concern that such a risk was reasonable, but also in view of cost and 
schedule problems. 
Several methods of detecting the flaw were inherent in the testing, but Project 
management did not recognize the value of or need for independent tests. Project 
management was concerned about the performance specifications and directed a 
subcontract to Eastrnan Kodak Company for an alternate primary mirror. The 
Eastrnan Kodak mirror was fabricated and tested using quite different techniques. 
The mirror or the instrumentation could also have served as cross-checks for gross 
error. Such error checks were not made, again due to total lack of concern about 
the possibility of gross error. Project management failed to identify a significant 
risk and therefore failed to consider mitigating actions. A formal discipline such as 
fault-tree analysis might have assisted the manager in directing his attention to this 
risk. 
B. MAINTAIN GOOD COMMUNICATION WITHIN THE PROJECT 
While proper delegation of responsibility and authority is important, this 
delegation must not restrict communication such that problems are not subject to 
review. In this case, the Optical Operations Division of P-E was allowed to 
operate in an artisan, closed-door mode. The impermeability of this Division 
seems astounding. The optical designers at P-E did not learn how their designs 
were being implemented; e.g., if the designer of the null correctors had been 
following their use, the data from the INC and the RvNC likely would not have 
been discounted. The data indicating the flaw was of great concern to some 
members of the division. Testimony indicates that their concerns were addressed 
at the level of the head of metrology and the division manager, but were not 
discussed outside the division at all. There were individuals who were not 
satisfied by the decision to rely only on the RNC data and remained deeply 
concerned. Their concerns and the data which caused them did not seem to come 
to the attention of anyone external to the division. P-E management should have 
been sensitive and open to these concerns. The P-E Technical Advisory Group 
should have found out what was going on in the Division and insisted on 
reviewing in-process data. NASA Project management should have been aware 
that communications were failing with the Optical Operations Division. 
Contributing to poor communications was an apparent philosophy at MSFC at 
the time to resolve issues at the lowest possible level and to consider problems 
that surfaced at reviews to be indications of bad management. 
A culture must be developed in any project which encourages concerns to be 
expressed and which ensures that those concerns which deal with a potential risk 
to the mission cannot be disposed without appropriate review, a review which 
includes NASA project management. 
C. UNDERSTAND ACCURACY OF CRITICAL MEASUREMENTS 
The project manager must understand the accuracy of critical measurements. 
P-E concluded, based on design considerations, that the RNC was the only test 
device which could achieve the required precision. They stated that its 
performance could not be determined by optical test but would be determined by 
component and assembly measurements which could be made in situ. 
P-E engineers regarded the RNC as "certified and the INC and RvNC as 
"uncertified." The terms were not defined, and "certification" was not 
documented. P-E discounted evidence of spherical aberration from INC and RvNC 
measurements on the basis of "uncertified status. In fact, the Board reviewed a 
recent as-built error analysis of both devices. The review showed the RvNC to be 
accurate to 0.02 wave rms and the INC to 0.14 wave rms. This indicates that the 
INC is a factor of three more accurate than the error observed in the INC/RNC 
interferograms. While in-process data were not subject to external review, which 
is another lesson, the methodology of test instrument use was reviewed by P-E 
and NASA management. This review could and should have questioned the 
judgment not to use the INC or the RvNC as independent checks of the accuracy 
of the RNC even though the precision was not to specification. Project 
management must understand critical tests and measurement. 
In addition, the project management must seriously consider the classification 
of test equipment that directly impacts the flight hardware. The RNC was classified 
as standard test equipment, which means that the RNC was not subject to the 
rigorous documentation and review requirements demanded of items classifed as 
flight hardware equipment. Under the contract, there were no Government 
regulations requiring that records for the RNC be maintained. Considering the 
importance placed on the RNC in the test program, management should have 
upgraded the level of classification of this equipment. 
Key decisions, test results, and changes in plans and procedures must be 
adequately documented. In preparing such documentation, individuals are forced 
to review and explain inconsistencies in the test data. This also provides a 
communication link to those individuals who are responsible for overseeing the 
project. 
D. ENSURE CLEAR ASSIGMMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY 
Project managers must ensure clear assignment of responsibility to QA and 
Engineering. NASA QA personnel were not optical system experts. The Project 
relied upon P-E Engineering to establish test and fabrication procedures, and P-E 
or NASA QA generally verified that Engineering approved and certified 
accomp~ishment of procedures. However, at times, NASA management seemed to 
rely on QA to verify the adequacy of procedures and the fact that they were 
satisfactorily accomplished. This lack of clarity apparently led to incomplete 
documentation and may have contributed to faulty procedures. The project 
manager must know what QA can and cannot do, and when it is necessary to rely 
on engineering for verifying its own procedures, management should be alert to 
the need for independent checks. 
Quality assurance, to be truly effective, must have an independent reporting 
path to top management. 
E. REMEMBER THE MISSION DURING CRISIS 
There will be a period of crisis in cost or schedule during most challenging 
projects. The project manager must be especially careful during such periods that 
the project does not become distracted and fail to give proper consideration to 
prudent action. At one point in the fabrication cycle of the primary mirror, an 
urgent reconimendation for independent tests to check for gross error entered the 
system, but was apparently not acted upon. Again, at the completion of mirror 
polishing, the final review of data for a final report was abandoned and the team 
reassigned as a cost-cutting measure. 
F. MAINTAIN RIGOROUS DOCXJMENTATION 
The project manager should ensure that documentation covering design, 
development, fabrication, and testing is rigorously prepared, indexed, and 
maintained. Because quality, at a minimum, consists in meeting requirements, it is 
not possible to determine whether the necessary quality is being achieved if the 
requirements are not set forth in sufficient detail and maintained in retrievable 
archival form. Adequate documentation also helps maintain a disciplined 
approach to fabrication and testing processes, especially with so complicated a 
project as the HST. 
GLOSSARY 
arcsec (arcsecond) A wedge of angle, 1/3600th of one degree, in the 360-degree 
sphere that makes up the sky. An arcminute is 60 seconds; 
a degree is 60 minutes. 
astigmatism A defect of curvature that prevents sharp focusing and 
degrades the quality of an image. 
axial Along the optical axis of a telescope. 
baffle Structure that obstructs stray light from the incoming image 
(see Figure 2-1). 
C&DH command and data handling 
Cassegrain A type of two-mirror telescope that reflects or "folds" 
incoming light. 
coma aberration A type of aberration where the rays from a point source do 
not meet at one focus, but rather spread into a comet- 
shaped area (see Figure C-2). 
concave A mirror surface that bends outward to expand an image. 
convex A mirror surface that bends inward to concentrate an 
image. 
CORI Coaxial Reference Interferometer 
DCAS 
DCMC 
DoD 
Defense Contract Administration Services, now DCMC 
Defense Contract Management Command, formerly DCAS 
Department of Defense 
Einstein The High-Energy Astronomy Observatory (HEAO-2) 
Observatory managed by Marshall Space Flight Center. 
EK Eastman Kodak Company 
FGS fine guidance sensors 
figure The shape of an optical surface. 
first light When an instrument's shutter is first opened and light 
enters the instrument. 
FLPE 
FOC 
focal plane 
fringe pattern 
GSFC 
HDOS 
Hindle test 
HST 
hyperboloidal 
image plane 
INC 
interferogram 
knife-edge test 
LMSC 
MRB 
MSFC 
NASA 
field lens position error 
Faint Object Camera 
The geometric plane where incoming light is focused by 
the telescope. 
The bright and dark alternating intensity pattern in an 
interferogram (see Figure D-1). 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
Hughes Danbury Optical System, Inc. 
An arrangement for testing a convex hyperboloid by 
retroreflection; used to shape the Hubble Space 
Telescope's secondary mirror. 
Hubble Space Telescope 
A slightly deeper curve, mathematically, than a parabola; 
the shape of the Hubble Space Telescope's primary 
mirror. 
The geometric plane in the telescope where the image is 
reconstructed. 
inverse null corrector 
A photograph of an interfering light pattern; used to test 
the figures of the Hubble Space Telescope's mirrors. 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
A simple, qualitative test to measure an optical figure. 
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Inc. 
Material Review Board 
Marshall Space Flight Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
OOD 
ORA 
OTA 
PA 
PCS 
P-E 
radial 
R-C 
rms 
RNC 
RvNC 
Optical Operations Division (at the Perkin-Elmer 
Corporation) 
Optical Research Associates 
Optical Telescope Assembly 
product assurance 
pointing control system 
Perkin-Elmer Corporation, now HDOS 
quality assurance 
quality control 
Perpendicular to the optical axis of a telescope; for 
example, instruments placed at a 90-degree angle from the 
optical axis of the Hubble Space Telescope. 
Ritchey-Chretien-A type of Cassegrain telescope where 
both the primary and secondary mirrors are hyperboloidal 
to correct for image aberrations; the Hubble Space 
Telescope's Optical Telescope Assembly (see Figure 2-1). 
root mean square 
reflective null corrector 
refractive null corrector 
SAIC Science Applications International Corporation 
spectrum The wavelength range of light in an image. 
SRM&QA safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance 
TDRSS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System 
vertex radius test A comparative measurement of the primary mirror's radius 
of curvature at its center. 
wavefront The surface composed of all the points just reached by a 
bundle of light rays from a source. 
wavelength (wave) The distance in a wave from any one point to the next point 
of corresponding phase (for example, the distance from 
one wave crest to the next is one wavelength). 
WF/PC Wide Field/Planetary Camera 
WFS wavefron t sensors 
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SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE 
OPTICAL SYSTEMS BOARD OF INVESTIGATION 
The Hubble Space Telescope Optical Systems Board of Investigation was 
formed in early July 1990 at the request of Dr. Lennard Fisk, Associate 
Administrator for Space Science and Applications, NASA. Dr. Lew Allen, Director 
of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, was appointed Chairman of the Board. The 
purpose of the Board was to review, analyze, and evaluate the facts and 
circumstances regarding the manufacture, development, and testing of the Hubble 
Space Telescope Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA). The Board was not open to 
the public or press. All of the relevant documents and hardware at the OTA 
manufacturer, Hughes Danbury Optical Systems, Inc. (HDOS) were impounded 
soon after discovery of the flaw, in preparation for the investigation. 
The objective of the investigation was to identifj., to the degree possible, the 
causes behind an apparent manufacturing flaw in one of the mirrors in the OTA, 
and to determine why the flaw, which impacts the focusing ability of the OTA, 
was not discovered prior to the launch of the spacecraft. Parallel efforts aimed at 
making a definite determination of the nature and location of the flaw through 
analysis of data retrieved from the orbiting HST were ongoing at the onset of this 
investigation. 
Serving the Board in an advisory capacity were Ms. Sarah Keegan, NASA Public 
Affairs Officer, and Mr. Gary Tesch, NASA Deputy General Counsel. Serving as 
staff to Dr. Lew Allen were Drs. Macgregor Reid and James Breckinridge, and, at 
the fourth meeting, Dr. Katherine Dumas, of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The 
Technical Recorder was Mr. Christopher Thompson of Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC). Representing Dr. Fisk at the Board meetings was 
Dr. Charles Pellerin, Director of the Astrophysics Division in NASA's office of 
Space Science and Applications. All of the non-NASA employees on and serving 
the Board were sworn in as Special Government Employees in order to bind them 
to Government regulations regarding conflicts of interest and disclosure of 
proprietary data. 
A full list of participants in each Board meeting follows the summary of that 
meeting. 
The first meeting of the Board took place July 5-6, 1990, in a conference room 
in the offices of the Vitro Corporation at 400 Virginia Avenue, S.W., in Washington, 
DC. Dr. Roger Angel was unable to attend this meeting. 
Dr. Fisk convened the Board on the afternoon of July 5 with a word of thanks 
and a reminder of the importance of the task that lay ahead. He charged the 
Board with determining the technical cause of the spherical aberration in the HST 
OTA and the reason why the aberration was not discovered prior to flight. He 
suggested that the Board look primarily at technical issues, noting that the period 
during which the mirrors were manufactured and integrated was turbulent for the 
HST program, with schedule and budget issues leading to a major reorganization, 
but that this history should only be considered to the extent that the Board found 
that it had an impact on the specific technical issue at hand. Dr. Fisk stated that 
he wanted a definite answer, rather than a fast one, and that the Board should do 
whatever it had to in order to uncover the cause of the problem. 
Dr. Fisk also noted that there was great interest in the HST problems both in 
Congress and in the press. He stated that NASA would not direct any Board 
member not to speak to the press, but reminded them that it would be 
inappropriate to comment on the findings of the investigation until it is complete. 
Dr. Fisk also stated that the Board members should not release any of the 
documentation of the Board themselves, since the documentation would be 
released through formal NASA channels. 
The first meeting of the Board focused on presentations arranged by the HST 
Project Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). These presentations, some 
of which were provided by HDOS HST Project personnel, were essentially 
background and tutorials on the manufacturing and testing of the mirrors for the 
HST OTA at HDOS (then the Perkin-Elmer Corporation), in Danbury and Wilton, 
Connecticut. Based on information gathered during these presentations, and on 
input the Board received from the HST Independent Optical Review Panel 
regarding the ongoing analysis of on-orbit HST data relevant to the aberration 
(included as Attachment I), the Board formed an initial plan for the investigation. 
This plan included document analysis, hardware testing, and personnel interviews. 
The Board concluded the fust meeting with an agreement regarding the release of 
impounded materials for the purpose of beginning a supervised investigation of 
the HST documents and test equipment at HDOS. 
B. PARTICIPANTS 
All members of the Board were present, with the exception of Dr. Roger Angel, 
who was unable to attend either day of the meeting. Also in attendance: 
NASA Headquarters 
Mr. Douglas R. Broome 
Mr. T. Jens Feeley 
Dr. Lennard Fisk 
Ms. Sarah Keegan 
Dr. Charles Pellerin 
Ms. Angela Phillips 
Mr. Gary Tesch 
Mr. Daniel Johnston 
Mr. Charles 0. Jones 
Mr. Fred S. Wojtalik 
Hughes Danbury Optical Systems 
Ms. Kathleen Beres 
Dr. Terence Facey 
Mr. William S. Raiford 
Mr. John D. Rehnberg 
Dr. John C. Rich 
Staff t o  the Board 
Dr. James Breckinridge, Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) 
Dr. Macgregor S. Reid, JPL 
Mr. Christopher J. Thompson, Science Applications International 
Corporation (SMC) (Technical Recorder) 
SECOND ME 
The second meeting of the Board took place on July 25-26 at the offices of 
Hughes Danbury Optical Systems, Inc. in Danbury, Connecticut. The full Board 
was in attendance and now included, as an observer, Dr. Robin Laurance of the 
European Space Agency. 
In the interim since the first meeting, a controlled easement of the impounding 
of documents and hardware at HDOS had taken place, as authorized by the Board. 
Under the supervision of NASA and the Defense Contract Management Command 
in Bridgeport, Connecticut, a review of HST documentation and test equipment at 
HDOS was also undertaken. Also since the first meeting, the Board appointed 
Mr. Robert E. Parks, an independent optics consultant, to serve as its full-time, on- 
site representative. Mr. Parks participated in data review and test planning at 
HDOS and was available to the Board as needed. The Board members were in 
regular communication with one another and with Mr. Parks during this time. 
Each received pertinent documents and plans for review via datafax as they 
became available. 
The meeting comprised status reports on work plan elements, reports on 
specific studies requested by the Board, and interviews with key former and 
current HDOS HST Project employees. The employees interviewed are listed 
below. As requested by the Board, HDOS presented a plan for characterizing the 
special test equipment known as null correctors used in manufacturing the HST 
primary mirror. HDOS also presented a status report on sensitivity analyses being 
performed on the test regimes and equipment used in characterizing the primary 
and secondary mirrors. These analyses, when complete, would provide 
mathematically feasible sources of the magnitude of spherical aberration observed 
in the HST imagery. The Board also reviewed options for detailed testing of a 
backup secondary mirror manufactured at the same time and according to the 
same specifications as the secondary HST mirror now on orbit. Finally, at the 
request of the Board, the HDOS HST Chief Scientist made a presentation on a 
focus test, using a 0.36-m collimator, that was performed several times on the OTA 
before and after it was shipped to Lockheed Missiles and Space Company for 
integration. 
The interviews of current and former HDOS HST Project personnel were done 
in two phases. The first phase, during which only the Board, its staff, and the 
interviewees were present, was a group interview on the manufacturing and 
testing of the primary and secondary mirrors. This phase centered on the two 
individuals primarily responsible for these activities, but all of the interviewees 
were able to amplify and offer information as they saw fit. There was substantial 
discussion of the design of the null correctors (a refractive null corrector that was 
used for checking the coarse figure of the primary mirror prior to polishing, and a 
reflective null corrector that was used for precise measurement of the figure of the 
mirror during and after polishing) and how the null corrector measurement data, 
known as interferograms, were analyzed. The second phase of interviews was 
conducted by the Board members alone, questioning each individual one at a time 
in closed session. The technician who used the reflective null corrector assembly 
on the primary mirror, still an HDOS employee, also met with the Board and 
explained the procedure in open session on the second day. 
Also during the second meeting, the Board toured the HDOS integration and 
test area where the primary mirror was polished and analyzed. The Board was 
able to visually inspect the exterior of the reflective null corrector assembly in the 
test tower, where it has remained unused since the last testing of the primary 
mirror in 1982. 
The second meeting concluded with agreement for HDOS to conduct 
supervised, noninvasive visual inspection of the primary mirror test equipment, for 
HDOS to continue with the test equipment sensitivity analysis, and for HDOS to 
further model the tests they proposed for characterizing the null correctors. The 
Board decided to postpone the authorizing tests of the backup secondary mirror. 
B. PARTICIPANTS 
All members of the Board were present, including, as an observer, Dr. Robin 
Laurance of the European Space Agency. Also in attendance: 
NASA Headquarters 
Ms. Sarah Keegan 
Dr. Charles Pellerin 
Mr. Gary Tesch 
Mr. Larry Hill (26th only) 
Mr. John Humphreys 
Mr. Daniel Johnston 
Mr. Joseph Randall 
Mr. Fred S. Wojtalik 
Defense Contract Management Command (Bridgeport) 
Lt. Col. Ken Bohannon, USAF (25th only) 
Hughes Danbury Optical Systems 
Mr. Robert A. Arnold* 
Mr. David Burch 
Mr. David Chadwick 
. Mr. John Cunniff 
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Mr. Albert F. Slomba* 
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Mr. Robert E. Parks, Consultant 
Dr. Macgregor S. Reid, JPL 
Mr. Christopher J. Thompson, SAIC (Technical Recorder) 
Mr. Peter Vallandigham, Vitro Corporation 
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The third meeting of the Board took place on August 15-16 at the offices of 
Hughes Danbury Optical Systems, Inc. in Danbury, Connecticut. The full Board 
and staff were again in attendance, including, as an observer, Dr. Robin Laurance 
of the European Space Agency. 
In the interim since the second meeting, the Board continued to review 
pertinent documents as they were uncovered at HDOS and MSFC. Mr. Parks 
remained on-site at HDOS to oversee the noninvasive inspection of the primary 
mirror test equipment and to participate in the document search and review 
process. 
The third meeting comprised status reports on visual inspections, document 
search and analysis, sensitivity analyses, and test planning. The meeting began 
with a closed Executive Session in which the Board discussed the status of the 
investigation. The open session began with an HDOS report on its review of 
recently recovered null corrector design documents. HDOS then reported on the 
completed sensitivity analyses of the HST OTA test equipment and procedures, 
which yielded a mathematically plausible source of the error as observed in the 
HST primary mirror. HDOS also reported on its visual inspection of the 
equipment in which this plausible error could have occurred, and gave a detailed 
presentation of the alignment procedures used on this equipment. Mr. Parks 
expressed his confidence in the analysis and inspection results, which pointed 
toward an observed lens spacing error in the reflective null corrector as the 
probable cause of the spherical aberration. The Board then reviewed the design 
and utilization of the reflective null corrector and ancillary measurement devices 
used in the procedures involving this equipment. 
The Board at this point noted the emergence of two veins in its activity, one of 
which was the determination of causality of the flaw and its persistence prior to 
flight, which was becoming conclusive, and the second of which was the detailed 
characterization of the flaw for corrective purposes, which would require 
substantial further testing. Pursuant to the second activity, HDOS next presented 
some possible techniques for more precisely characterizing the aberration in the 
mirror, data which would be of use for the effort to design corrective lenses for 
the replacement flight optics for HST, and also reviewed their progress in setting 
up a proof-of-concept simulation of a "wire test" they were proposing for the null 
correctors. 
During the evening of the first day, the Board held a general discussion of the 
test philosophy and quality control techniques in place on the HST program at 
HDOS, and of what steps regarding certification of the null correctors would now 
be prudent as part of an effort to better characterize the flaw in the on-orbit 
primary mirror. 
The second day of the meeting comprised revisiting the HDOS presentations 
from the first day, presentations by Board members on options for further testing, 
and a discussion among the Board members of how to organize the final report of 
the investigation. HDOS personnel presented further details regarding sensitivity 
analyses and test options as requested by the Board the previous day. Two Board 
members also offered options for further testing, including a temperature 
sensitivity analysis of the primary mirror test facility, as well as a primary mirror 
simulation technique. The Board, recognizing that the first vein of its activity, 
determining the cause and persistence of the flaw in the mirror, was moving 
toward conclusion, then addressed the organization of the final report and agreed 
upon a preliminary outline and writing assignments. 
The third meeting of the Board concluded with plans to hold the next meeting 
in the middle of September, again at HDOS. Prior to adjournment, the Board 
reviewed a statement for the press regarding their progress thus far. 
B. PARTICIPANTS 
All members of the Board were present, including, as an observer, Dr. Robin 
Laurance of the European Space Agency. Also in attendance: 
NASA Headquarters 
Ms. Paula Cleggett-Haleim 
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Ms. Laurie K. Furey 
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Mr. Tom McHugh 
Mr. David Olson 
Mr. William S. Raiford 
Mr. John D. Rehnberg 
Dr. John C. Rich 
Hughes Corporation 
Mr. James Knotts 
Staff to  the Board 
Dr. James Breckinridge, JPL 
Mr. Robert E. Parks, Consultant 
Dr. Macgregor S. Reid, JPL 
Mr. Christopher J. Thompson, SAIC (Technical Recorder) 
Mr. Peter Vallandigham, Vitro Corporation 
Mr. William B. Wetherall, Optical Research Associates 
The fourth meeting of the Board took place on September 12-13 at the offices 
of Hughes Danbury Optical Systems, Inc. in Danbury, Connecticut. The full Board 
was in attendance, again including, as an observer, Dr. Robin Laurance of the 
European Space Agency. NASA Public Affairs Officer Ms. Sarah Keegan, who was 
unable to attend the third meeting, was again present. Mr. Gary Tesch, NASA 
Deputy General Counsel, did not attend. Dr. Macgregor Reid of JPL, who served 
as staff to Dr. Allen for the investigation, was unable to attend this meeting and 
was replaced by Dr. Katherine Dumas. Also in attendance, at the request of the 
Board, were Dr. C. R. O'Dell of Rice University, who was the HST Project Scientist 
at MSFC, and Dr. Daniel Schroeder of Beloit College, who was the HST Telescope 
Scientist. Both are still under contract to NASA. 
A British Broadcasting Company film crew was permitted to briefly film the 
Board on the first day as part of a documentary on HST being produced for the 
NOVA television program. The Board held a press conference at HDOS on the 
afternoon of the second day to bring the press up-to-date on the status of the 
investigation. 
At the August 15-16 meeting in Danbury, the Board had requested status 
updates on elements of the work plan, including reports on specific studies, 
measurements, and analyses. 
In the interim since the third meeting, HDOS continued to perform 
measurements and analyses under the supervision of Mr. Parks. Also during this 
period, the Board members drafted submissions for the Board's final report, which 
were given to Dr. Allen for review. Information regarding all of these activities 
was transmitted to and among the Board members via datafax, as were some of 
the requested documents. 
The first day of the fourth meeting comprised updates and discussions of 
ongoing tests, measurements, and related plans for characterizing the HST OTA 
primary and secondary mirrors. As at the previous meeting, particular attention 
was paid to the null correctors used in manufacturing and characterizing the 
primary mirror. In response to prior requests from the Board, HDOS reported on 
the following issues: 
(1) Progress in sensitivity analyses of the inverse null and of the refractive 
and reflective null correctors 
(2) Estimated cost, schedule, and performance parameters for building a new 
inverse null for the refractive null corrector 
(3) Analysis of the likely maximum error in the conic constant of the 
secondary mirror 
(4) Options toward a plan for more precisely characterizing the wavefront of 
the primary mirror. These wavefront data are needed by the teams that 
will build the replacement instruments for HST. 
Also on the first day, the Board interviewed Drs. OIDell and Schroeder to gain 
their insights into what was known, and by whom, about the primary mirror's 
figure during the manufacturing and test effort at HDOS. Mr. Fastie was 
interviewed by a teleconference call. 
HDOS also presented an important discovery made during the week prior to 
this meeting. They found that the light beam used to reflect off the metering rod 
which spaced the field lens from the lower RNC mirror instead reflected off the 
field cap set on the end of the rod. The resulting change in the overall length of 
the metering-rod/field-cap assembly is quite close to the field-lens spacing error 
measured in the reflective null corrector. 
B. PARTICIPANTS 
All members of the Board were present, including, as an observer, Dr. Robin 
Laurence of the European Space Agency. Also in attendance: 
NASA Headquarters 
Ms. Sarah Keegan 
Mr. John Humphreys 
Mr. Daniel Johnston 
Mr. Charles 0 .  Jones 
Mr. Joseph Randall 
Mr. Max Rosenthal 
Mr. E d  Trentham 
Mr. Fred S. Wojtalik 
Mr. H. John Wood 
Beloit College 
Dr. Daniel Schroedef 
Hughes Danbury Optical Systems 
Mr. Robert A. Arnold 
Mr. R. Thomas Dubos 
Dr. Terence Facey 
. Mr. William Freeman 
Ms. Laurie K. Furey 
Mr. David Goux 
Mr. Howard D. Hall 
Mr. Richard T. Kertesz 
Mr. Malcolm MacFarlane 
Mr. Fred A. Marra 
Mr. Arthur Napolitano 
Mr. David Olson 
Mr. William S. Raiford 
Mr. John D. Rehnberg 
Dr. John C. Rich 
The Johns HopMns University 
Mr. William Fastie** 
Rice University 
Dr. C. R. O'Dell* 
Staff to the Board 
Dr. James Breckinridge, JPE 
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Mr. Mark Kahan, Optical Research Associates 
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-- 
*Interviewed by the Board 
**Interviewed by the Board via teleconference call 
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APPENDIX I3 
HST INDEPENDENT OPTICAL IREVIEW PANEL FINDINGS 
The conclusions that follow are based on information presented to the 
committee during briefings on July 5, 1990 at BDM in Columbia, Maryland. 
I. There is an approximate one-half wave rms spherical aberration 
residual in the Optical Telescope Assembly. 
There is no indication that this wavefront error comes from any 
source other than the OTA since it is observed in the WF/PC, the 
Faint Object Camera (FOC), and the wavefront sensors. 
2. The spherical aberration error cannot be corrected with any of the 
existing HST controls. 
3. If coma and astigmatism are observed, they can be corrected with 
existing HST controls. 
In the presence of a large spherical aberration residual, the 
wavefront sensor may not be adequate to sense small amounts of 
coma and astigmatism. Coma and astigmatism may be detected with 
the upgraded instruments and hence correctable as required. 
4. Replacement instruments can be corrected for the spherical 
aberration error of the telescope assembly so that the original performance 
targets can be met. 
If the OTA surface which is in error can be identified, an even 
better job of redesigning the instruments can be done. 
5. An accurate knowledge of the spherical aberration error is required, 
but can be determined from the image characteristics sensed by various 
onboard instruments. 
The method of deconvolving imagery from the W/PC and the 
FOC to provide the magnitude and sign of the spherical aberration 
error appears to be an effective and promising approach. k~ on- 
orbit test program which accumulates results for a large number of 
observations needs to be started immediately. All testing of this sort 
should be done with as narrow a spectral band as possible, and at 
wavelengths in the near infrared to permit a more accurate analysis 
of the fine structure in the images. 
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6. The backup primary mirror should be tested using the HDOS and EK 
null lens optics. Measurement of the No. 2 secondary mirror should also 
be done to aid in identifying the source of the spherical aberration error. 
Testing the secondary will be the quickest way to isolate the 
source of the error, and to determine whether it came from the HST 
primary mirror or secondary mirror. 
7. To fully correct the spherical aberration of the OTA, some of the 
optical elements in the replacement instruments will need to be replaced 
or added. 
This should be a fairly simple task involving little more than 
changing the aspheric surface profiles of the reimaging optics. 
8. A replacement wavefront sensor having a wider dynamic range 
should be considered. 
The present unit functions poorly in the presence of such large 
amounts of spherical aberration. 
9. An OTA simulator which has a spherical aberration residual which is 
the same as the HST must be designed and fabricated so that the redesigned 
instruments can be tested prior to launch and installation in 1993. 
Duncan Moore 
Professor, Institute of Optics 
University of Rochester 
Aden Meinel 
Distinguished Scientist 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Daniel Schulte 
Senior Staff Scientist, Optical Design 
Lockheed Palo Alto Research Labs 
Paul Robb 
Manager, Optical Sciences ~ a b  
Lockheed Palo Alto Research Labs 
George Luwrence 
Professor, Optical Sciences Center 
University of Arizona 
Dietrich Korsch 
Optical Science Consultant 
Korsch Optics 
Attachment 1 
APPENDIX C 
TUTORIAL ON SPHERICAL AND COMA ABERRATION 
A. ODUCTION 
The term "aberration" 1; used to describe an error within an optical system 
where a clear, sharp image does not appear at the image plane. Aberrations are 
divided into two classes based on what has to be done to the optical system to 
correct for the aberration and thus make a clear, sharp image. The easiest class of 
aberrations to correct for comprises tilt and defocus aberrations. These are 
corrected by realigning the optical elements and optical surfaces by tilting them 
and by refocusing the system to produce a clear, sharp image. The other class of 
aberrations, "higher-order" aberrations, is more difficult to correct. Examples of 
higher-order aberrations are spherical aberration and coma aberration. Spherical 
aberration occurs when light reflects from different points on the surface of the 
mirror and focuses at different places along the optical axis. Spherical aberration 
is present on the optical axis. Coma aberration appears in images off the axis. 
These aberrations cannot be corrected by using the simple procedures of tilt and 
refocus, but rather require either a change to the curved optical surfaces, which 
are figured into the solid glass, or the positioning of corrective lenses (similar to 
eyeglasses) within the ligh: path. 
B. SPHERICAL ABERRATION 
Spherical aberration is illustrated in Figure C-1. Figure C-l(a) shows a concave, 
spherical mirror. A point source object (not shown) is a large distance to the left. 
The optical axis is a line running through the center of curvature and passing 
through the spherical surface. The vertex is that point on the curved optical 
surface that is intersected by the optical axis. 
Four optical rays from the entire bundle of optical rays that intersect the mirror 
are shown coming from the point source to the left. These rays are parallel to the 
optical axis. Two are shown close to the optical axis, and two are shown far from 
the optical axis. 
In the case of a spherical mirror, .the rays closest to the axis focus at a point 
farther from the mirror vertex than do those rays farther from the axis. The two 
rays close to the optical axis in Figure C-l(a) strike the mirror surface near the 
vertex of the mirror, reflect to the left, and converge, intersecting the optical axis at 
a point called the paraxial (or reference) focus. The two rays far from the axis and 
near the mirror edge reflect from the spherical mirror, travel to the left, and 
intersect the optical axis at a point called the marginal focus. The paraxial and 
marginal foci represent the extremes of a continuum of foci. 
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Figure C-1. Light-path comparison between spheric and aspheric mirrors. 
(a) The perfectly spherical mirror shows light reflecting to the two extreme 
foci, causing spherical aberration. (b) To remove this spherical aberration, 
an aspheric mirror is created by grinding down the edges of the mirror. 
Note that the marginal focus is not the same focus as the paraxial focus. The 
difference between these two foci is the spherical aberration. Spherical aberration 
occurs when rays reflecting from different locations on the mirror focus light at 
different points along the optical axis. By convention, the sign of the spherical 
aberration shown in the Figure is positive, since the marginal focus is to the right 
of the paraxial focus. 
If we put a mask over the optical system shown in Figure C-l(a) and let only 
rays close to the optical axis reflect from the concave mirror, the image will be a 
clear, in-focus point at the paraxial focus. In that case, we will have placed the 
opening of the mask over the center of the mirror, and made the light-collecting 
surface area smaller. This results in faint images of bright objects. Faint points of 
light (for example, faint stars) would not be recorded at all at the image plane. To 
increase the light-gathering ability of the mirror, the light-collecting surface area 
must be increased. Therefore, the diameter of the bundle of optical rays that 
reflects from the mirror is increased. As the aperture is increased, we admit rays to 
the system that are farther and farther from the optical axis. The marginal rays do 
not focus at the same point as the paraxial rays, and a blurred image appears. In 
no single position of the image plane is there a "best" focus. The image cannot be 
made sharp by refocusing the optical system. 
C. CORRECTING FOR SPHERICAL ABERRATION 
To remove the spherical aberration from this system, we need to figure, or 
shape, the spherical mirror into a parabolic (aspheric) surface. To make the 
marginal rays cross the optical axis at the same focal point as the paraxial rays, the 
surface is figured into a parabola by removing material from the outer surfaces of 
the mirror, Figure C-l(b). The amount of material we need to remove increases 
with distance from the optical axis. The radius of the basic sphere (the aspheric 
surface's vertex radius) establishes the paraxial focal position: the process of 
figuring does not change this focus. Removal of mirror material results in 
superimposition of the marginal focus onto the paraxial focus. 
D. FIELD OF VIEW 
A single point source contains limited scientific information, and it is therefore 
desirable to image across an area of the sky. The area of the sky from which the 
detector (or camera) receives light is called the field of view. The field of view 
can be affected by many factors: the aperture of the telescope, the size of the 
detector, and any intervening baffles or obstructions within the telescope 
assembly, 
E. COMAABE ON 
We have seen that spherical aberration is caused by rays reflecting from 
different portions of the mirror and converging to foci at different points along the 
optical axis. Coma aberration occurs at a region off the optical axis in the field of 
the image where rays reflecting from different portions of the mirror form images 
at different points. Understanding the behavior of both spherical and coma 
aberration within the Hubble Space Telescope has provided us with useful 
diagnostic tools to determine how the error occurred. 
Figure C-2 shows the character of perfect images, images with spherical 
aberration, and images with coma aberration. The small dot at the left of the 
Figure is representative of a perfect image of a point source. At the center of the 
Figure, the image of the point source is large and blurred, the way it appears at 
the image plane in the presence of spherical aberration. At the right of the Figure 
is shown the character of the point source with coma aberration: a point off the 
optical axis in the image-plane field. The coma image of the point source 
appears as a "V"-shaped figure. The tip of the "V" is bright and the other end 
appears to be a flaring of the light away from the tip. 
F. CORRECTING COMA AND SPHERICAL ABERRATIONS ACROSS THE FIELD 
A telescope built with a single large mirror, either an asphere or a sphere, has 
a relatively small field of view for quality imaging; that is, image quality degrades 
rapidly as field angle decreases. To provide a high-quality, aberration-free image 
over a larger field of view than can be provided by a one-mirror system, a two- 
mirror optical system was selected for the Hubble Space Telescope. Reflecting the 
light from two aspheric mirrors gives the telescope enough degrees of freedom to 
correct aberrations across a field of view large enough to be of interest to 
scientists. 
An optical system where the light reflects from two hyperbolic surfaces gives 
good correction for both spherical and coma aberrations over the field of view 
required for the HST. This optical design approach is called a Ritchey-Chretien 
design and was selected as optimum for the Hubble Space Telescope. 
f = OPTICAL SYSTEM AXIS 
Figure C-2. Image distortion due to spherical and coma aberration. Left: 
The small dot represents a perfect image of a point source. Center: The 
image grows and blurs in the presence of spherical aberration. Right: In 
the presence of coma aberration, the image appears V-shaped, bright at the 
tip and flaring away. 
The configuration for this two-mirror optical system is shown in Figure C-3. 
Four rays are shown entering the optical system: two near the axis (paraxial rays) 
and two far from the axis (marginal rays). The specific aspheres selected for each 
of the HST mirrors are hyperbolas of revolution about their axes. By making both 
mirrors hyperbolic surfaces, the coma and spherical aberrations can be corrected 
over the desired field of view. The form of the primary mirror (the mirror that 
light strikes frrst) is concave. The form of the secondary mirror is convex. If the 
two hyperbolas are manufactured perfectly, then the telescope is well corrected 
over a relatively large field of view. 
The primary mirror is generally figured with a hyperbolic surface by using 
methods similar to those discussed above for the parabolic surface. That is, the 
surface is figured into a hyperbola by removing material from the outer surfaces of 
the mirror. The amount of material we need to remove increases with distance 
from the optical axis. The radius of the basic sphere (the hyperbolic surface's 
vertex radius) establishes the paraxial focal position. 
In the case of the HST, the "template" (the reflective null corrector) used to 
provide the reference surface for figuring the primary mirror, was not correct. In 
Figure C-4, we show an enlarged view of the marginal and paraxial rays as they 
converge in the vicinity of the vertex of the HST. Figure C-1 was used to show 
how the marginal focus could be superimposed on the paraxial focus by removing 
material. In the HST, too much material was removed from the outer edges of the 
primary mirror, and the marginal focus was moved to the right, past the paraxial 
focus. Since the marginal focus is to the right of the paraxial focus, the sign on 
the error is negative. Since more material than necessary was removed, the 
opticians call this situation "overcorrected spherical aberration. 
MARGINAL RAY 
_ - - . - , _ - - - - - -  
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
PARAXIAL RAY , '
-- 
- 7 - - - - - - -  
OPTICAL 
--- - 
--- 
AXIS - 
c-- ---- 
----- 
- - 
- ----  
- - - - - -  
- - 
_ ~ _ _ - - - - - - -  
-- - 
- ,  - ===- 
- 
-44 ---- 
 
SECONDARY ---- -- 
MIRROR WITH - - --L.-,- - - .___ -*- - - - - - 
--t- 
IMAGE 
CONVEX PARAXIAL RAY 1 PLANE 
HYPERBOLIC 
f 
(SHOWN 
SURFACE ENLARGED IN 
1 
' FIGURE C-4) 
'\ 
' 
' 
MARGINAL RAY 
PRIMARY -/ 
MIRROR WITH 
CONCAVE 
HYPERBOLIC 
SURFACE 
Figure C-3. The HST's Ritchey-Chretien optical system. Two hyperbolic 
mirrors are used to correct for spherical and coma aberrations. 
OPTICAL 
Figure C-4. Image-plane enlargement of the HST Ritchey-Chretien optical 
system. In the HST, too much material from the edges of the primary 
mirror was removed, and the marginal focus was moved past the paraxial 
focus. This is characteristic of an optical system overcorrected for 
spherical aberration. 
APPENDIX D 
DESCRIFTIVE SUMMARY OF INTERFEROGRAMS 
DESC S OF ERO S 
The principal evidence to identify the error in the Hubble Space Telescope's 
Optical Telescope Assembly is obtained from the interferograms acquired during 
testing, along with coordinated analysis based upon the actual, as built, 
measurements of the null correctors. In this Appendix, the principal 
interferograms are presented, along with a description of their importance and 
implications toward defining the error in the telescope. 
Interferometry was the test choice for evaluating the mirror because of the 
intrinsic accuracy of mapping the mirror surface by using light within the 
wavelength bandwidth used in the telescope. The fringe patterns from the 
interferograms were analyzed by digitization into contour maps and subsequently 
evaluated by computer against numerical criteria for acceptance. The 
interferograms were also made and used repeatedly to obtain information about 
the progress during fabrication, as well as being used as a gauge in determining 
the final quality of the mirror surface. 
Generally, the optical-path error between successive dark fringes in an 
interferogram indicates a path difference of one wavelength. Reflection from the 
mirror surface causes each fringe to indicate a surface-height error of one half of a 
wavelength on the surface of the primary. A different, double-pass test 
configuration divides this iderpretation in half for the secondary mirror's 
interferogram. 
At the time of fabrication of the HST optics, the method used in interferometry 
was to adjust the interferometer to introduce tilt, and thus many parallel fringes, 
into the aperture. These interferograms were photographed and scanned on a 
microdensitometer to digitize the locations of the fringe centers for computer 
mapping and analysis. 
Current technology primarily uses high-speed video collection and on-line 
computer analysis of interferometric data. Real-time interferometer technology was 
at its infancy during the HST fabrication, and thus was not used on the telescope. 
A. FINAL TEST OF THE PRIMARY MIRROR 
Figure D-1 is an interferogram taken through the reflective null corrector in 
February 1982 of the primary mirror fabricated by Perkin-Elmer Corporation at the 
completion of the processing of that mirror. The interferometer was adjusted to 
provide a large number of fringes to obtain complete coverage of the surface of 
the prirnary'mirror. The interpretation of this fringe pattern is that each fringe 
represents a surface error on the mirror of one half of a wavelength of helium- 
neon (He-Ne) laser light. A perfect mirror should provide straight, equally spaced 
fringes in the adjustment of the interferometer used in testing. Deviations from 
straightness or unequal spacing indicate flaws in the mirror. 
The interferogram shows essentially straight fringes with only minor deviations 
of the wavefront from perfection. This interferogram was analyzed by Perkin- 
Elmer to indicate a residual surface error of less than 0.014 wave rms at 632.8 nm, 
or a surface smoothness of 0.009 pm rms. The testing process used a Coaxial 
Reference Interferometer (CORI), which was capable of producing extremely high- 
quality fringes and used a He-Ne laser as the source. This analysis convinced the 
Project that the goals of the fabrication had been achieved. 
The dark area in the center of the picture corresponds to the central hole in the 
primary mirror, and is almost exactly matched by the central hole in the reflective 
null corrector (RNC). There is a small chip in the lower mirror of the RNC that 
shows up as an irregular area on the interferogram. 
It is now known that at the time the reflective null assembly contained about a 
1.3-mm spacing error for the field lens and, consequently, was producing a null 
wavefront that did not match the desired hyperbolic form. Therefore, close 
correspondence of the fringes actually indicates a very close match to the wrong 
aspheric surface. The symmetry of the fringe pattern indicates that the error is also 
symmetrical and corresponds to a spherical aberration error. 
An analysis of the best available data from the test records and the as-built 
information from the tests indicates that the actual aspheric mirror would produce 
a third-order spherical aberration wavefront error of about 0.4 wave rrns at 
632.8 nm. 
This interferogram shows three circular obscurations that cover penetration 
holes in the mirror surface. The obscurations were not directly part of the mirror 
support system, but they covered catch plates that would keep the mirror from 
breaking loose of the mount and damaging portions of the space shuttle orbiter, 
should the shuttle have had to abort the flight and return to Earth in an emergency 
landing. The fringe pattern also indicates the presence of local, sharp surface 
errors that actually fall outside of the clear aperture being used in the telescope. 
The semicircular marks at the periphery are fiducials used to locate the aperture in 
the fringe digitization process. The other defects indicated in the picture are glass 
chips and marks attached to components in the reflective null corrector. 
Figure D-1. RNC interferogram of the primary mirror, taken in 
February 1982. 

During this test, the primary mirror was resting on a flotation mount designed 
to provide an artificial "zero-gravity" condition by supporting the mirror uniformly 
on 128 mechanically loaded support. points. The process of testing required that 
the primary mirror be adjusted upward toward the RnTC until straight fringes could 
be observed. In the test procedure used, the focus of the system was adjusted 
during the process by changing the location of the primary, while the components 
of the RNC and interferometer were held fixed. The lengthy distance from the 
RNC to the mirror was not precisely measured. 
B. REFRACTIVE NULL CORRECTOR TEST OF THE PRIMARY MIRROR 
Figure D-2 is an interferogram of the primary mirror taken through the 
refractive null corrector (RvNC) in May 1981. The curvature of the fringes 
indicates the presence of an error in the primary mirror, analyzed recently to be 
0.4 wave rms at 632.8 nrn third-order spherical-aberration wavefront error. This 
error matches to a reasonable level of certainty the error existing in the flight 
telescope. This value also matches well the spherical aberration calculated to be 
caused by the mistake in the assembly of the reflective null corrector. 
The interferogram was taken using a common path interferometer, which does 
not provide as high-contrast fringes as does the Coaxial Reference Interferometer 
on the RNC. The original purpose in performing the test was limited to obtaining 
data on the base radius (for defining the focal length) of the primary mirror based 
upon comparison with a calibrated spherical test plate. The common-path 
interferometer was used with a broad-spectrum light source and visual observation 
to validate the absolute path matching between the primary mirror and the 
spherical reference mirror, which appears in the center of the hole in the primary. 
The difference in curvature between the central reference sphere and the primary 
mirror fringes in the zone nearest the hole was used to measure the radius of 
curvature of that inner zone. 
The fringe pattern shown in Figure D-2 was obtained using a He-Ne laser as 
the light source. The experimental conditions in the setup produced a grainy, 
speckled pattern. The bright, washed-out region near the edge of the primary 
hole is due to the use of a common-path reference for the interference. The 
interpretation of the fringes is the same as in Figure D-1, with each fringe 
indicating a one-half wavelength of surface error in the mirror. 
The fringes in the RvNC were not interpreted at the time of the original testing 
of the primary mirror. It was believed at the time that there were some errors in 
the RvNC, which led to less confidence in the data from that corrector. The 
purpose of using the RvNC for the radius test was to permit continuous viewing of 
fringes across the entire aperture. 
Although the spherical aberration is clearly evident in Figure D-2, the intention 
in the test procedure was only to provide a straight fringe reference in the inner 
portion of the mirror, and no attention was to be paid to the curve fringes. 
Computer evaluation of these fringes in 1990 by several different observers led to 
the determination of the 0.4-wave rrns wavefront error at 632.8 nm third-order 
spherical aberration. 
C.  INVERSE NULL CORRECTOR FRINGES 
The interferogram in Figure D-3 shows a set of fringes obtained from the 
inverse null corrector (INC) assembly through the RNC in 1981. The analysis of 
fringe data taken in 1981 and 1990 (see Chapter VI) shows that when the lateral 
shift adjustment for the position of the INC is accounted for, there is excellent 
correlation of the wavefront errors implied by the INC. This indicates not only the 
hndamental error in the RNC, but also the excellent stability of the entire CORI 
INC assembly. 
The inverse null was designed to provide a simulation of the primary mirror. If 
all had gone well, the presence of straight fringes in the use of the INC would 
have indicated a perfect setup of the RNC. As is noted, the fringes were not 
straight, and indicate the presence of several waves of spherical aberration in the 
wavefront. The amount is comparable to, and of the opposite sign as, the amount 
observed in the telescope. 
The actual use of the INC during testing was as an aid in alignment of the RNC 
system, and the INC was swung into position below the RNC at the beginning and 
end of each test sequence. The technicians used the INC fringes as a qualitative 
check upon the condition and alignment of the RNC, but the fringe pattern was 
apparently not fully evaluated at any time during the test period. It was known 
that the components of the INC were very sensitive to alignment, and also that 
there was a probable spacing error in the INC. Subsequent analysis has indicated 
that this error is of small magnitude. 
The consistency of the data from the INC and the RvNC indicates the presence 
of the error in the RNC. The excellent agreement of the INC data taken in 1981 
and similar data taken in 1990 indicates the excellent stability of the RNC. 
Figure D-2. RvNC interferogram of the primary mirror, taken in May 1981. 

Figure D-3. INC interferogram of the reflective null corrector, taken in 
February 1981. 

D. SECONDARY MIRROR TEST WTERFER0GRA.M 
Figure D-4 is one of a set of interference fringes obtained from the flight 
secondary mirror at the completion of fabrication. A Hindle Shell test, which uses 
a double bounce off the surface of the secondary mirror, produced a distance 
between fringes corresponding to a surface-height variation of 0.25 wave. The 
secondary mirror is quite smooth, with an rms surface error of 0.012 wave. The 
small circular zones have an error of about 0.018 wave peak-to-valley at 632.8 nrn. 
Because of the double bounce, the appearance of the fringes doubles the effective 
wavefront error that this component introduces into the system. 
An interferogram alone cannot be used to determine the absolute surface 
shape, that is, the radius and conic constant, of the mirror. The adjustment of the 
test setup must be controlled to determine this base surface. However, in the 
fabrication process, the aspheric surface figure was tested by fringe counting 
against a standard spherical test plate. The setup parameters of the Hindle Shell 
test were dimensionally controlled to set the absolute conjugates, thereby 
controlling the reference asphericity of the secondary mirror. The interferogram in 
Figure D-4 shows essentially no residual spherical aberration. This independent 
verification during fabrication makes it plausible to assume that no gross error in 
asphericity exists. Test data analysis at the time concluded that the tolerances had 
been met. 
Analysis of this interferogram in 1990 supports, with only minor differences, the 
predicted quality of the surface shape. 

Figure D-4. Hindle Shell interferogram of the secondary mirror, taken 
August 31,1981. 
APPENDIX E 
HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE 
PERFORMANCE BASED ON AS-BUILT DATA 
B E  SPACE m E S C O P E  PERF0 CE 
BASED ON M-BUILT DATA 
The HST is a two-mirror Ritchey-Chretien telescope whose nominal optical 
design is completely described by the parameters in Table E-1. (All these 
parameters have tolerances, and the HST will image imperceptibly less well than 
the ideal design of Table E-1 if the parameters drift slightly from that ideal design.) 
Table E-2 gives the measured values of the parameters in Table E-1 in the as-built 
condition. The as-built condition takes into account errors in the measuring 
equipment, as well as small errors in the actual measurements. The numbers in 
Table E-1 represent the best estimate as to the "truth" of these parameters. 
The as-built conic constant in Table E-2 is derived from a combination of 
analyses performed over the last several months of the refractive null corrector 
(RvNC) interferograms (Figure D-2), the inverse null corrector (INC) interferograms 
(Figure D-3), and of the optical design as to the effect of the measured error in 
field lens position. 
A comparison of the differences in these two tables leads to the following 
observations about the HST imaging performance: 
(1) If the HST had been built to the ideal design of Table E-1, the images 
would have been diffraction-limited, or theoretically perfect, within the 
bounds of the laws of physics. 
(2) If the HST had been assembled from the as-built components in Table 
E-2 with the design-value conic constant on the primary mirror and 
"perfectly" polished surfaces, the images would still have been ideal. 
(3) Because it is impossible to polish the mirror surfaces "perfectly," there 
is some degradation from ideal performance. When the residual (but 
within specification) polishing error is included as part of the as-built 
parameters, the imaging performance falls within 95 percent of ideal 
or diffraction-limited performance. This would still have resulted in 
over 70 percent of the light from a single star falling within a circle of 
0.1-arcsecond radius, precisely as the specification called for. (Notice 
that the small degradation from ideal performance has to do with 
residual polishing errors that are expected in any telescope and not 
from any design problem.) 
Table E-1. HST OTA paraxid design parameters. 
Parameter Value 
Primary Mirror 
Radius, mm 
Conic constant 
Working aperture, mm 
Secondary Mirror 
Radius, mm 
Conic constant 
Spacings 
Back focal plane, mm 
behind primary vertexa 
Primary-secondary separation, mrn 
1 1,040.0 (concave) 
-1.0022985 
1,200.0 
1,358.0 (convex) 
-1.49600 
Derived first-order parameters 
Magnification 10.434569 
System f/number 24.00125 
aLocation set by instrument package. 
Table E-2. HST OTA paraxid as-built parameters. 
Parameter Value 
Primary Mirror 
Radius, mm 
Conic constant 
Working aperture, mm 
Secondary Mirror 
Radius, mm 
Conic constant 
Spacings 
Back focal plane, mrn 
behind primary vertexb 
Primary-secondary separation, mm 
Derived first-order parameters 
Magnification 
11,041.70 (concave) 
-1.013236a 
1,200.0 
1,358.065 (convex) 
-1.49600 
System f/number 24.00666 
aNote: The primary mirror conic constant is the actual conic constant now on the 
mirror, due to the null corrector spacing error. 
bLocation set by instrument package. 
(4) If the as-built error in conic constant on the primary mirror (Table E-2) 
is added into the telescope design, the result is the third-order 
spherical aberration observed in the HST wavefront on orbit. 
(5) This unwanted third-order spherical aberration also shifts the position 
of best focus farther away from the back of the primary mirror. 
(6) Since the instrument package is fixed in space, this small focus error 
can be corrected by moving the secondary mirror slightly. 
(7) The total third-order spherical aberration is, however, affected by 
changing the secondary mirror spacing, which results in a small 
correction to the observed error. 
(8) When all these considerations are taken into account, at the best focus 
position, that is, the focus position that minimizes the rms wavefront 
error or puts the maximum energy into the central core of the image, 
70 percent of the light from a single star is contained in a circle of 
about 0.7 arcsecond in radius (Figure 5-1). 
9 The r m  wavefront error at this best focus position is 0.4 wave at a 
wavelength of 632.8 nm, the wavelength at which the telescope was 
tested. Since the telescope is used over a broad wavelength range, it 
is perhaps better to say that the rrns wavefront error is 0.253 pm at 
best focus. 
While the Board considers the above analysis to be correct, and has included it 
for informational purposes, it must be considered preliminary and should not be 
used for the design of new instruments or other critical purposes for several 
reasons: 
(1) It was not in the Board's charter to quantify the error beyond the 
degree necessary to be certain that the source of the error had been 
isolated, and thus time was not taken to do so more precisely. 
(2) The measurements made on hardware during the investigation were 
made to an accuracy sufficient to verify the source of the error but not 
with sufficient accuracy to give a definitive value for the spacing error. 
(3) There is still some confusion, because of a lack of documentation, as 
to the exact sizes of apertures, central obstructions, and fiducial 
locations needed to get definitive results from the analyses of extant 
interferometric data. It is easy to determine the shape of the 
wavefront from these data, but the magnitude of the spherical 
aberration depends sensitively on the exact aperture over which it is 
evaluated. 
(4) The definitive prescription for the HST wavefront must come from a 
careful weighting of all the various sources of data, including orbital 
data. 
